BANGLADESH HUMAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT (2005)
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Summary

Despite rapid growth and progress towards some MDGs, human security in Bangladesh is widely perceived to be poor. This study developed a methodology for human security assessment based on a dual track approach: developing scores for six categories of human security and cross-checking with changes in drivers of insecurity identified through an independent analysis of each category of insecurity. We reached a number of important conclusions about the weakness of the existing data as well as areas of significant human insecurity that can be identified using the available evidence and an analysis of drivers.

i) **The Available Data are too weak to allow a credible tracking of human security over time.** The available data on human security in Bangladesh is not usable for credible assessments of levels of human security or for tracking trends. It is primarily based on collations of newspaper reports and as a result, *suffers from wide differences between reporting agencies, significant differences in the magnitude and direction of year to year changes reported by different agencies, and do not allow scaling up to the national level to assess levels of risk in an objective manner*. Our recommendation is to commission periodic sample surveys on critical human security indicators. Even relatively small sample surveys would enable assessment and tracking that was credible on statistical grounds. However, the available data and our analysis of the drivers of different categories of insecurity enabled us to identify a number of relevant conclusions for policy.

ii) **Factional Political Competition is an important cross-cutting driver of insecurity.** A number of powerful crosscutting drivers affect most of the important human security categories in Bangladesh. In particular, the political accumulation strategies of patron-client factions play a critical role in driving moderate to high levels of human insecurity. Intense factional political competition directly results in many types of human insecurity. In addition, it affects the operation of the administrative and judicial systems, contributes to land and asset related conflicts, exacerbates the insecurity faced by religious and other community groups, and sustains criminal gangs. While the main drivers of this competition can only be addressed in the medium to long term, we need to distinguish between 'normal' levels of insecurity driven by structural features of factional competition and 'exceptional' levels that signal significant structural or cyclical variations.

iii) **Creating legitimate opportunities for the 'intermediate classes' is likely to have strong positive effects for human security.** Political competition between factions is led by political entrepreneurs from the 'intermediate classes' and is in turn driven by the limited attractiveness of the employment and accumulation opportunities open to these politically powerful classes. A policy recommendation is that while pro-poor spending is justified on welfare grounds, the creation of employment and accumulation opportunities for the lower

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middle classes (who are also quite poor in absolute terms) is likely to have strong positive effects for human security over time.

iv) **A clientelist political system can provide moderate human security if the balance of power between factions forces a 'live and let live' compromise.** The 'normal' operation of a moderately stable patron-client polity requires a regular cycling of factions in power, and stable expectations of the excluded that they will have their turn at political accumulation soon. This 'live and let live' compromise between leading factions is critical for moderate security to be achieved. One of the triggers that led to a precipitate decline of security in Bangladesh from 2005 onwards was the attempt by a faction *within* the then ruling party to monopolize power and control access to lucrative political accumulation prospects. Unfortunately, outsiders are unlikely to be of much help in engineering the emergence of a favourable balance of power between factions, but a better understanding can at least avoid strategies that are unlikely to be of much help. There is also room for optimism that the balance of power between the many political factions in Bangladesh will in the long run prevent monopolization by any particular faction. The problem is that every faction has to recognize this reality and outsiders can help by initiating a more open discussion of these issues without engaging with the obfuscating ideological conflicts entertained by the parties.

v) **Fiscal constraints are critical for explaining the persistence of patron-client politics and the insecurity associated with it.** Fiscal constraints that are a feature of underdevelopment means that improvements in governance *across the board* or political stability based on social democracy are unlikely to be feasible very soon. Improving the fiscal space to pay for security and for redistributive strategies that benefit the socially powerful intermediate classes is critical for long run stability.

vi) **The reform focus should be to achieve better human security in a small number of critical sectors.** Pragmatic reforms can be pursued to weaken some of the drivers of human security, and we discuss some important ones in connection with each of our categories. There are two aspects of human security that are simultaneously critical. One concerns the security of individuals and sectors critical for driving economic growth, whose security is disproportionately important for broader society. A second is the security of particularly vulnerable individuals and groups. Social policy should be concerned with a selection of critical areas of both types. For instance, policy needs to focus on reducing the human insecurity associated with critical land rights that are important for economic growth as well as the land rights of very vulnerable social groups.

vii) **Exaggerating the threat of Islamist radicalism is counterproductive.** Our analysis of the drivers of the spike in Islamist activity in 2005 suggests that this was driven largely by factional competition between mainstream parties exploiting small Islamist factions who pose a very small threat on their own. Over-emphasizing the latent danger of international Islamist networks entering Bangladesh is paradoxically likely to actually encourage the emergence of new Islamist factions and the alignment of existing factions with international Islamist forces to increase the price they can extract for supporting mainstream coalitions.

viii) **Robust and authoritarian responses to security (like RAB or military interventions to resolve factional political conflicts) are not sustainable solutions.** RAB is the latest in a long line of robust responses which began with the Rakkhi Bahini of the early 1970s. These institutional responses achieve immediate results but they do not address the critical drivers of insecurity addressed in this study and are at risk of being absorbed into the clientelist political system and contributing to more serious insecurity over time.

1.   INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh has achieved considerable success in the last two decades in terms of economic growth and progress towards some critical MDGs. With growth rates of 5.2% per annum over 2000-04, Bangladesh was one of several Asian economies enjoying a sustained growth spurt over two decades. But there is a widespread perception, not least within Bangladesh, that in terms of governance and aspects of wellbeing related to human security, performance has not improved over this period and some aspects of human security may even be deteriorating. Personal security and the security of property is a serious concern for many Bangladeshis. (As if to underline the seriousness of the situation, one of our Bangladeshi researchers was stabbed and robbed while this assessment was being carried out). Political violence and instability also remain persistent drivers of insecurity despite the hopes raised at the time of Bangladesh's transition to democracy in 1991.

There is clearly an anomalous relationship in Bangladesh (and in many other developing countries) between economic growth, progress towards the MDGs and progress towards other aspects of human security. We need a better understanding of these relationships, and in particular of the drivers of a range of critical human security conditions that go beyond the governance conditions normally considered in economic and governance assessments. Our aim in this assessment is to provide a framework for an ongoing assessment of the broader human security situation in Bangladesh that can identify *levels* and *changes* in levels of human security and to identify the implications for policy. This first assessment is for 2005.

Section 2 summarizes the methodology used in this assessment. Section 3 discusses the data limitations we faced, the immediate ways in which we went around these limitations, and our suggestions for better data collection to achieve more coherent assessments in the future. Section 4 discusses the second plank of our assessment, the analysis of the drivers of different types of human security. Section 5 provides our assessment of human security in Bangladesh for 2005 for the six categories of human security selected for this assessment exercise.

2.   METHODOLOGY

This section discusses two issues: the types of human security that we will be assessing, and our methodology for assessing levels and trends.

i) What do we mean by human security and why should we assess it?

Development is a multi-faceted process that includes but is not limited to economic development. Drawing on this consensus view of development, the United Nations defined broader freedom as the presence of conditions *that ensure 'freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom to live in dignity'* (Annan 2005). We draw on this definition to define human security in the broadest sense to mean the achievement of all of these freedoms. The achievement of freedom from want requires progress on economic security and this is already extensively assessed in assessments of economic growth, progress towards the MDGs, poverty reduction, and changes in income distribution. In this assessment we concentrate on other aspects of broader freedom that are normally ignored in these types of economic assessments. This is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Economic Security and Broader Human Security

Our focus is on the most important of the excluded aspects of human security. Progress in *economic* security is already extensively assessed in Bangladesh and in other developing countries in economic surveys that assess growth in national income, changes in income distribution, changes in poverty levels, and so on. However, a very wide range of conditions may be relevant for assessing progress in achieving broader freedom in terms of greater freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. The range of conditions that may potentially be relevant is far too large to be practically assessed in a comprehensive way. Some judgement has to be exercised to determine the conditions that are the most relevant in each country context. To identify the most relevant aspects of broader human security in Bangladesh, we used a consultation exercise (see Appendix A) to determine the categories of human security that Bangladeshi stakeholders and development partners believed were most relevant for understanding impediments to broader development in the Bangladeshi context.

Our consultation exercise focused on the non-economic aspects of human security and through it we identified a number of areas of concern that we then grouped into six broad categories. The factors driving insecurity in each of these categories are not necessarily exclusive to that category as there are important crosscutting factors and issues affecting multiple categories. The six categories (in no particular order) look at different aspects of human insecurity that are broadly associated with or result from

> **A) Characteristics of politics and the political system** (threats to the security of persons and their property coming from the operation of political competition between parties and factions that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity),
> **B) Conflicts over property** (threats to the security of persons and their property coming from the contestation and conflicts over property including land, water bodies, and natural resources that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity),
> **C) Characteristics of the administrative and judicial systems** (threats to the security of persons and their property coming from the misuse, malfunctioning or lack of capacity of administrative and justice systems including the bureaucracy, security services and the administration of justice that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity),
> **D) Violence and discrimination against women** (threats to the security of women and their property coming from political, administrative, legal, and cultural discrimination against women that affect the right of women and girls to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity),
> **E) Violence and discrimination against ethnic, religious and other community groups** (threats to the security of ethnic, religious and other community groups and their property coming from political, administrative, legal, and cultural discrimination against these groups that affect the right of individuals in these groups to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity), and
> **F) Crime** (threats to the security of persons and their property coming from all types of crime and extortion that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity).

Clearly, many other areas of human security could potentially be identified that are important for achieving progress towards the broadly defined freedom from fear and to live in dignity.

Our assessment focuses only on those aspects of human security that were identified as most relevant for the Bangladeshi context, rather than attempting a comprehensive assessment. The available evidence on human security in Bangladesh was collected for this assessment by three Bangladeshi researchers who produced reports on each of these categories.

As our categories were identified through a consultative process, the extent and causes of human insecurity in these categories are important for policy-makers in their own right. But secondly, all of our categories of human security are broadly related to governance issues (such as the stability of property rights and political stability) that can be expected to affect and be affected by economic growth (see Figure 1). This relationship may not be immediately obvious because the relationship may be complex and non-linear. For instance, relatively rapid economic progress may be possible with low levels of human security in some or all of our non-economic categories (as is clearly the case in Bangladesh and many other developing countries) but a worsening of human security in some of these areas may eventually have disproportionately negative effects on economic performance. Identifying potential areas of vulnerability and tracking human insecurity in these areas may therefore be important for sustaining progress in other areas of human security directly related to economic growth and poverty reduction. For both sets of reasons, an assessment and analysis of human security in these categories can assist development policy and complement economic assessments.

ii) Methodology for Assessing Human Security
Ideally, a credible assessment of levels and changes in human security should approach the problem from a number of different angles that allows measures to be cross-checked. The method we developed for this assessment is shown in Figure 2. The first component is a scoring exercise to give a score to human security in each of our six categories (box 1 in Figure 2). While this is critically important for assessments over time, the available data in Bangladesh did not allow the immediate attribution of scores to our human security categories. This is because the data available did not allow a credible extrapolation to estimate the extent of insecurity at the national level. A scoring exercise is, however, important if changes in levels of security are to be identified, so we establish a methodology that could be used, together with a sampling strategy to provide appropriate data for a scoring exercise in the future. The available data only allowed us to derive possible directions of change in levels of human security in 2005, and even that with low levels of confidence, but we use this for the 2005 assessment exercise.

The second component of a credible assessment (box 2 in Figure 2) is to analyse the drivers of insecurity in each category, distinguishing between drivers of cyclical variations and of longer-term trends in human insecurity. The third and final step is to compare observed changes in levels identified in component 1 (or in our case qualitative information about the direction of change in levels using the limited data currently available) with evidence of changes in the drivers of insecurity analysed in component 2. If a change in drivers corresponds with an observed change in levels of human security, this corroborates our observation and enhances our confidence in observed changes. Moreover, the analysis of drivers and our observation of changes in drivers can also help to identify whether observed changes in levels of security are due to changes in long-term trends or are cyclical changes. The difference between the two is important for determining appropriate policy responses.

The output of the full assessment is to report levels and changes in levels of human security, to identify the nature of these changes (trends or cycles), identify crosscutting issues and discuss the policy implications. As scoring was not possible for this immediate exercise, we

have not provided scores for our categories for 2005, but we have used the available data and evidence on possible directions of change in levels of human security, together with an analysis of drivers and crosscutting issues to identify the likely trends in human insecurity in each category, identify the likely nature of these changes and to identify the most important policy implications.

Figure 2 Methodology of Human Security Assessment

3. DATA REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

This section discusses the data requirements for an effective implementation of the methodology summarized in Figure 2. We discuss first, the data required for an effective assessment and scoring exercise, secondly, the type of data that is actually available in Bangladesh and its limitations, and finally, the steps that could be taken to generate more appropriate data in the future.

i) Data Requirements

Effective assessment requires a measure of the level of insecurity in our different categories that can be compared over time and that is transparent enough to be replicated by other observers. To achieve this in a credible manner requires some minimum data requirements, not only because the assessment involves making judgements about situations that are difficult to measure, but also because any judgement is likely to be controversial and therefore has to be as free as possible from subjective biases.

For comparisons over time, we need a simple numerical score for the level of human insecurity in each category. We agreed on a simple scale that ranks the degree of insecurity in each category on a scale from 1 (lowest level of insecurity) to 4 (highest level of insecurity). However, to avoid subjectivity, scores cannot be simply based on 'expert opinion' as these can be justifiably ignored by those who disagree with the judgement. Our proposed method is designed to overcome many of the objections of subjective bias faced by existing scoring methods.

The proposed scoring methodology is discussed more fully in Appendix C. Our method is to break down each of our broadly defined categories into a number of more narrowly defined sub-categories where transparent judgements can be reached about the *proportions* of the potentially affected population that may be affected by insecurity of a particular type or severity in a particular year. This method reduces the potential of subjective bias to its minimum. While the assessor is still making a judgement based on extrapolating the available data and evidence, the judgement is about proportions of affected population, and others with better data or evidence can update or challenge the assessment in a transparent way (Box 1 provides an example).

Box 1 Scoring Human Security: An Example

Consider category (i), "human insecurity resulting from characteristics of politics and the political system". A credible score for a broadly defined category such as this can only be based on assessments of a number of narrowly defined sub-categories that cover an adequate range of types of insecurity within the category.

The number of sub-categories can be relatively small (between 3 and 5 for each category) as the intention is not to be exhaustive but to select sub-categories that shed light on important aspects of insecurity within a category. In particular, sub-categories should be selected to capture types of insecurity faced by different economic classes, geographical regions, and so on. For instance, the insecurity faced by a landless peasant may be very different from that faced by an urban professional. However, if we cover a few of the most important sub-categories, the aggregate of these scores can give us a credible score for insecurity for that category of human security that can be compared over time.

As an example, suppose we decide that one of the sub-categories within category (i) is violence faced by members of political parties in the course of political activism. This sub-category

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focuses on a particular target group as political activists in Bangladesh come primarily from the intermediate (middle and lower middle) classes. The scoring then involves a number of steps.

Step 1. Using national or comparative data we establish the likely upper and lower bounds for the proportions of the affected population that define the worst and best scores for this sub-category for that country. The upper bound is the 'nightmare scenario' that is nevertheless imaginable as a possible scenario for the country. Let us say that comparative evidence or past history suggests that the nightmare scenario (defining the highest level of insecurity) is reached when more than 15% of individuals involved in political activism in the country are victims of violence during a year.

We may judge that at these levels, small increases in violence no longer matter as the country had already reached the most dangerous levels of insecurity. Then an assessment that 15% or more of political party members suffered from violence would score 4 on our scale. At the other extreme, we can define the lower bound (the highest level of security) in the country as a situation where less than 5% of party members face violence. The highest score need not be reserved for a zero level of violence because while zero violence is desirable, blips within a low range could be expected even if the highest feasible level of security is achieved in any country, particularly a developing one. The low level that is selected would correspond to a score of 1.

Both the highest and lowest levels should be scaled such that reaching these levels is imaginable for the country concerned, otherwise the country would be stuck on an intermediate score purely because of an inappropriate scaling of the range. Intermediate scores would be in between the upper and lower bounds. In our example, 5-10% would score 2, and 10-15% would score 3.

Step 2. The team then evaluates the available data and evidence to provide an assessment of the proportions of the relevant population that are affected by this particular insecurity. While this is a *judgement*, it is a transparent judgement about scale that others can challenge on the basis of alternative data sources or other evidence. *But critically, this judgement can only be made if the available data can be used to estimate the proportions affected for the relevant population at the national level.*

Step 3. The assessment team indicates a confidence level for each score to indicate the quality of the underlying data on which their extrapolation to the national level was made (see our Methodology Appendix C for details). The confidence level could range from very high (census or near-census data available) to very low (very patchy and partial data extrapolated by the assessor).

Step 4. The scores for the different sub-categories are then aggregated to provide a score for the category.

Our proposed methodology allows us to focus on sub-categories where data should have been available to reach transparent judgements about security levels. We do not need comprehensive data on every aspect of human security. We only need data and evidence on some critical sub-categories that can be used to shed light on the likely level of human security in each category.

ii) Data Limitations in Bangladesh
Despite the limited data requirements we set for ourselves, we found that the type and quality of secondary data available in Bangladesh precluded any scoring of human insecurity *in any category or sub-category* that we looked at. This was an unexpected finding, particularly given the large amount of data that was being collected on human insecurity in Bangladesh

by NGOs and others. Unfortunately, all of this data is 'collected' in a way that makes it unsuitable for reaching informed judgements about the *levels* of insecurity that could be compared over time.

Almost all of the available data on human insecurity in Bangladesh are based on tabulating newspaper and media accounts of particular types of insecurity (for instance deaths due to political violence). As the sum totals of newspaper reports in any particular year are clearly not based on scientific sampling methods (nor should we expect them to be), this data cannot be used to extrapolate *either* the extent of insecurity in any particular year *or* to compare changes in the level of insecurity across years *even at the lowest level of confidence*.

The sampling problem we are referring to emerges not because the data collecting agencies are arbitrary in their sampling of newspapers, but rather that newspapers are not obliged to follow any consistent sampling strategy or follow strict categorization rules in reporting stories from month to month or year to year. This makes the media-derived data on human insecurity in Bangladesh entirely inappropriate for a credible assessment of human security for at least four reasons.

i) Newspapers are often reporting events before the full facts are known and in many cases, incidents of human insecurity may be misclassified. For instance, violence due to land conflicts may be misreported as political violence or communal violence and vice versa. This is particularly likely because each incident typically has multiple drivers and only trained personnel following a transparent methodology can reliably identify the dominant characteristic of different incidents in a consistent way. Relying on newspaper reports for a classification of human insecurity in different categories has significant dangers.

ii) Stories that are interesting for newspapers need not reflect a full coverage of different types of human security or include the most important types. For instance, newspapers may cover deaths of political activists much more prominently than deaths or asset losses of landless peasants. There may be occasional stories about the latter but little detail of magnitudes or the processes involved. As a result, the categories covered in NGO data on human security are very partial.

iii) We have no way of knowing whether year-to-year variations in the total numbers reported are due to random variations in newspaper coverage or reflect real changes in underlying insecurity. For instance, it is possible that an increase in coverage of a particular type of insecurity may reflect growing public or international concern with a particular type of insecurity rather than a real increase.

iv) We have no way of knowing what percentage of the population is covered by newspaper reporting, so we have no way of extrapolating from newspaper reports to the national figure. This is particularly important because if we take the absolute figures reported for numbers of people affected by different types of insecurity in Bangladesh, they are often extremely low for a country of over 130 million people. If we are unable to extrapolate to the national level we have no way of identifying *levels of risk* for different population groups *even to orders of magnitude*. Box 2 summarizes some of the characteristics of the data available in Bangladesh. The problems described are ultimately due to the sourcing of this data primarily on media reports. Box 2 also demonstrates why scoring is not possible with this data *at any level of confidence*.

Box 2 Limitations in the Human Security Data Available in Bangladesh

i) Very large differences in figures reported by different agencies.
Consider for instance the figures reported for deaths due to political violence. In 2004, ASK (Ain O Shalish Kendro) report 62 deaths (based on scanning 12 newspapers) while Odhikar reported a figure almost 10 times higher, 526 deaths (based on 18 newspapers). The ratio of almost 1:10 in the figures of these two agencies is repeated in 2005 (see Appendix B Table A.1). However, when we look at figures for injuries in political conflicts, the figures from the two agencies are comparable, suggesting that the differences are not just due to differences in the numbers of newspapers scanned by the two agencies, but more likely due to differences in the coverage and definition of different types of incidents by different newspapers (Appendix B Table A.2). It is also unclear what steps agencies take and how effective they are in avoiding problems of double counting when multiple papers report the same incidents.

Another example of great variations in reported insecurity is provided by figures for violence against women (often described as 'physical torture' of women in the Bangladeshi literature). The reporting agencies do not precisely define the types of violence included in this category and this undoubtedly contributes to the huge variance in reported figures. In 2005 Bangladesh Mahila Parishad reported 1350 cases of violence against women, while the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) report barely 10% of that number, 137 incidents, and Karmajibi Nari report a mere 88 cases. Remarkably, all these figures are serious underestimates compared to the figure for reported cases of violence against women recorded at the Bangladesh Police Headquarters, which recorded 2945 cases of reported violence against women (Appendix B Figure D.1 and Table D.1). As the police figures are themselves far from comprehensive, this underlines the seriousness of the gaps in some of the figures coming from newspapers.

Similarly, 2005 figures for rape provided by NGOs and women's associations are roughly 30% of the figure of rape cases recorded by the Bangladesh Police Headquarters (Appendix B Table D.1 and Table D.3). But in contrast, the same NGOs and women's organizations report roughly 8 times more murders of women in 2005 compared to the 117 murders reported by the Bangladesh Police Headquarters (Appendix B Table D.1 and Table D.5).

ii) Very large differences in year-to-year changes reported, both in magnitude *and* direction of change.
Given the staggering differences in the coverage of different agencies, it is not surprising that when it comes to reporting year-to-year changes, for a large number of data categories different agencies frequently record *different directions of change* (and not just different magnitudes of change).

For instance, looking at the figure for murders of women in 2005 compared to 2004, Bangladesh Mahila Parishad records a small rise of 12%, BNWLA records a significant *drop* in the number of murders by 67%, while Karmajibi Nari records a huge *rise* of 195% (Appendix B Table D.5). A quick glance through the tables in Appendix B shows that these discrepancies are the norm for most data categories.

This could be due to poor tabulation and different ways in which double counting is dealt with by different agencies, but also to random changes in coverage of different types of incidents by different newspapers, each of which has different editorial policies for deciding newsworthiness. A slightly different sample of newspapers could then result in different directions of change being reported.

iii) Data missing for assessing many critical sub-categories.
Newspaper-based data are not classified in ways that allow us to distinguish between insecurities faced by different income classes, or urban and rural populations. Reports on many other types of insecurities are altogether missing. For instance, if we are interested in the extent of insecurity faced by poor and landless people when their (limited) assets come under threat or are grabbed by more powerful individuals or factions, we find no figures on this. Perhaps there are insufficient newspaper mentions of these events to generate even limited data. But we know that these are significant social processes that contribute to considerable human insecurity for large classes of Bangladesh's population.

iv) Absolute numbers reported are relatively low, with no information that would allow scaling up to the national level.
This is the most fundamental problem which precludes any attempt at using newspaper-based data for an assessment exercise. An assessment of human security has to be able to scale up from samples to a national figure for proportions of population affected. This is impossible using newspaper figures without having independent estimates of the percentage of the total affected population covered by these newspapers. What we do know is that the figures emerging from newspaper reports are relatively small in absolute magnitude.

For instance, if Bangladesh in 2005 had the same incidence of rape as the US (62.5 per 100,000 females), there would have been roughly 40,000 rapes in Bangladesh. In contrast, if Bangladesh had the incidence observed in England and Wales (43 per 100,000 females), there would have been roughly 28,000 cases of rape in 2005. But NGOs and women's organizations report under 1000 rapes in Bangladesh in 2005 while the Bangladesh Police HQ figure is 2797 (Appendix B Tables D.1 and D.3).

Clearly, the figures for rape reported by newspapers in Bangladesh are a 'sample' but we have no sampling information that would enable us to scale these figures to the national level. So we have no way of knowing whether Bangladeshi women in 2005 faced the UK level of risk, the US level of risk or a very different level of risk altogether. Without being able to scale the risk in this way, there is no credible way in which human insecurity can be assessed or compared over time.

Similarly, consider the insecurity faced by Hindus who risk becoming victims of communal violence. From newspaper data, ASK reports that in 2004, 12 Hindus were killed in communal violence (Appendix B Table E.4). Even if we take at face value the newspaper classification of the cause of these deaths, we face a fundamental problem. There are roughly 13 million Hindus in Bangladesh and if 12 died in 2004 as a result of violence directed against this community (less than 1 per 1,000,000), the insecurity of Bangladesh's Hindu minority due to 'hate-driven violence' would be lower than that of many ethnic minority groups in the UK. Of course, in this case too, 12 is a 'sample' picked by a collection of newspapers, but we have no statistical information to scale this (or any other figures for deaths due to communal violence) to the national level.

This scaling problem applies to the data available for every category of human security that we wish to assess.

The data weaknesses summarized in Box 2 were so serious that we could not even establish *orders of magnitude* (that is how many zeros to put after a figure for the numbers affected at the national level) for any type of insecurity at any level of confidence. This also means that at the moment we cannot determine the appropriate higher and lower bounds for scores in different sub-categories of insecurity. This has to await preliminary results of a sample survey so that scores can be appropriately calibrated.

We were forced to conclude that the large amounts of data collected on human insecurity in Bangladesh (often with donor support) are statistically useless for a credible assessment exercise. As newspapers are not responsible for collecting statistics on a sound sampling basis, this is not a criticism of Bangladeshi newspapers, but it is a serious criticism of the data collection strategies of agencies that are attempting to monitor levels and trends in human insecurity of different types.

These weaknesses are of particular concern because the resources could have been better spent on collecting data that was more usable. Of no less concern is that this weak data is being used by international agencies, (including the US State Department and others) to make judgements about levels and changes in human insecurity affecting Bangladesh.

iii) Proposed methodology for data generation for future scoring exercise
A recommendation of this report is that to achieve credible assessments of human security we need to consider carrying out annual or other regular sample surveys. The household samples could be relatively small if they were carefully stratified according to the national mix of regions, income classes, religious communities, and so on. The survey would seek to enumerate the incidence of events within the sample that fall within the categories of insecurity being assessed.

A sample survey would solve two problems. First, it would provide scalable data on the sub-categories we are interested in, so we could extrapolate from the sample figures to estimates of national figures with tolerable levels of confidence. Secondly, a sampling approach would allow us to generate data in areas where none exists in terms of newspaper-based data. For instance, the sample survey could be used estimate the proportion of the poor who faced threats of asset loss in a year or the proportion who suffered physical violence in connection with asset grabbing.

A sampling approach could also establish degrees of confidence in the data in different sub-categories. For any sub-category of human insecurity, an incident reported by a household affecting one of its members could be followed up by on-the-spot verification by third parties (neighbours, police records where relevant, and so on) or reported as unverified. This would establish confidence levels about the veracity of what was reported as well as confidence in its classification in a particular category of insecurity.

The minimum required sample size would depend on the categories that were being assessed. As some categories affect only a subset of the whole population (for instance, some minority groups are relatively small), to include an adequate sample of these sub-populations, the total sample would have to be larger. But a sample size of roughly 1500 to 2000 households could provide statistically usable results for most of our categories in an assessment exercise. The sample results can then be used to extrapolate to national levels and used with our scoring methodology to produce credible national human insecurity scores. Not all sub-categories of human insecurity are amenable to assessment by sample surveys because of the sensitivity of respondents. For instance, credible figures for rapes are unlikely to be collected through such a method. A sample survey approach would have to exclude sub-categories where this method is likely to yield biased results. However, related sub-categories (violence against women, murders or suicides) may give closely correlated information about changes in levels of insecurity faced by women. For sub-categories or categories that are not suitable for a sample survey approach, available figures from other sources can be assessed or improved to provide a crosscheck. For instance, trends in police figures for reported rapes could be used

to provide a crosscheck to the trends emerging from data for other sub-categories of insecurity faced by women.

The proposed method would mitigate many of the problems of subjectivity that have prevented assessments of insecurity or governance quality being taken seriously by those who disagree with the levels identified. Our evaluation of the available data should also alert national and international agencies to the dangers of using the existing data to assess the state of human security in Bangladesh. More details on a workable methodology are provided in Appendix C.

4.   DRIVERS OF INSECURITY

If we were only interested in a backward looking analysis, the pattern of scores over time would be sufficient to indicate trends in human security. But if the assessment has to be forward looking and give us *early warning* of significant changes, *we need to combine a scoring approach with an analysis of possible drivers that could indicate if some changes are more significant than others for future trends*.

An important component of our assessment (outlined in Figure 2) is therefore an analysis of the drivers of human insecurity in different categories to corroborate whether the direction of change observed in levels of security correlates with changes in different drivers that may be causing the change. This not only to helps to corroborate our data on level changes, it also allows us to assess the significance of the change observed.

The levels of human security in any category will fluctuate from year to year for different reasons. Apart from errors of measurement and random fluctuations, any observation over time is typically a product of long term trends and cyclical movements around that trend. Cyclical fluctuations can be an important source of year to year variations in human security, and an analysis of drivers is particularly important for distinguishing between cyclical fluctuations and more significant changes in trends.

Cyclical fluctuations are likely to be related to cycles in a number of underlying drivers of insecurity. For instance, cycles of human insecurity can be related to political/electoral cycles, which can result in an upsurge of some types of insecurity in the run-up to elections or other cyclical political phenomena, or economic cycles, which can exacerbate conflicts driven by scarcity. To complicate the story, the frequency and amplitude of cyclical fluctuations as well as the direction and slope of the trend can change over time.


Figure 3 Human Security: Levels, Trends and Cycles

Figure 3 shows what is at issue in graphical form for a hypothetical category of human security. The unbroken lines show the trend and cycles we expect on the basis of past observations of human security scores. We begin with observation 1 which shows a situation

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where human security is satisfactory and improving. This observation is consistent with the historically observed patterns of trends and cycles shown by the trend and cycle lines in Figure 3. However, we then have observation 2, where we observe a deterioration of human security in this category.

Despite the deterioration, observation 2 could still be consistent with the pattern of cyclical fluctuations associated with the historical trend. If so, even though human security has deteriorated, it is not yet a cause for long-term concern as the trend could still be positive, though we could be concerned about the drivers of the cyclical fluctuations. However, the same deterioration could also indicate the beginning of a new negative trend, shown by the broken trend line and new cycles around a worsening trend. Observation 2 on its own does not allow us to discriminate between these two possibilities, but a forward-looking assessment should warn us if the second possibility was likely.

If we rely only on observations, we will not know if there has been a significant break in the trend till observation 3. A parallel analysis of drivers of human insecurity and how *they* are changing can complement the scoring part of the assessment exercise and warn us as early as observation 2 that the human security situation may be structurally changing. This would be the case if the deterioration picked up in observation 2 was associated with changes in drivers that suggest a structural shift rather than simply cyclical fluctuations. The discussion of drivers therefore plays a significant role in a forward-looking assessment exercise.

Ideally, the analysis of drivers should i) help to corroborate changes in levels observed in the scoring exercise, and ii) help to give advance warning of trend shifts and changes in patterns of cycles. In an initial or early assessment such as this one, when historic patterns based on past scores cannot be identified, the analysis of drivers can play a particularly important role in making sense of any changes in levels observed over the recent past. In our case, an analysis of drivers is particularly important because of the limitations in the available data and evidence (discussed in Box 2), which meant that we could at best identify *directions of change* for *some* categories of insecurity. As a result, we relied heavily on our analysis of drivers to assess the significance of changes that appear to have taken place in 2005.

The subsequent section looks at our six categories in turn, discussing the crude available evidence, the likely drivers of human insecurity in each category and the likely significance of the observed data given these drivers. Each category discussion will therefore combine the second and third components of our assessment methodology (Figure 2). In contrast to the dearth of hard data and evidence on human insecurity, our identification of possible drivers for our categories of human security can draw on a rich analytical literature on the causes of different types of human insecurity in developing countries including Bangladesh.

5. ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY CATEGORIES

This section looks in turn at the six categories of human security identified for assessment. Each category is dealt in four sub-sections. In sub-section 1, we examine the available evidence and derive any conclusions about recent trends that are warranted on the basis of the limited available evidence. In sub-section 2 we identify the most important drivers of human security in that category on the basis of available empirical and theoretical work in Bangladesh and elsewhere. In sub-section 3 we examine the correspondence between changes in the drivers identified and recent trends to derive the best possible conclusions about whether the observed changes are due to cyclical variations or more fundamental changes in trends. Finally, in sub-section 4 the discussion of each category ends with a discussion of possible policy responses to the levels and changes observed in that category. This structure is followed for all six categories, but the first category of insecurity resulting from characteristics of politics and the political system is the subject of a long discussion as this is both the most entrenched source of human insecurity in Bangladesh as well as having drivers that feed into almost all the other categories of insecurity.

A. HUMAN INSECURITY RESULTING FROM CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.

Politics and the political system in Bangladesh are directly and indirectly responsible for many aspects of human insecurity. The regular violations of the rights of persons and property (that are often formally protected in law) are very often the direct result of violence or expropriation carried out through the political process. These violations are not associated with particular parties as they happen irrespective of the party in power. In this section, we focus on the direct effects of politics and the political system. However, the drivers of this category of insecurity have important crosscutting effects on almost all of our other categories. For instance, the instability of property rights, the violence and insecurity related to land and asset grabbing, many of the insecurities caused by the interventions and failures of the administrative and judicial systems, and many of the attacks on the land and assets of vulnerable groups including religious and ethnic minorities are related to the accumulation strategies of political factions. These aspects of insecurity will be separately looked at in other categories.

A-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
The available evidence on recent changes has some contradictory aspects but the *overall direction is a general deterioration in many aspects of security connected with politics in 2005*. The deterioration could be a cyclical one related to the electoral cycle, with elections approaching and the opposition gearing up in 2005 to challenge the appointment of the proposed head of the interim government and the Chief Election Commissioner. Our analysis of the drivers of patron-client competition suggests that this cyclical decline promises to be much worse than the 'normal' violence of pre-election patron-client politics in Bangladesh and may trigger a serious and sustained deterioration.

Only a limited number of sub-categories were covered by the available data for 2005, mostly focused on deaths and injuries due to political conflicts, mostly of political activists. Given the range of variation in the absolute numbers reported, we will only report directions of change and percentages. But note that even percentages do not mean very much, given the weaknesses in the data (see Box 2). The focus should only be on the *directions of change* indicated, and that also with some caution.

Within this category of human security, there were improvements in human security in two sub-categories and deterioration in five sub-categories. These sub-categories are not necessarily the most appropriate ones, but are the ones for which data is available.

a) Deaths resulting from political conflicts. The sub-category of deaths due to political conflicts overlaps with many other categories of insecurity in a patron-client polity. The political system is marked by intense and violent political conflicts between parties and between factions within parties. But political factions are also frequently mobilized to 'resolve' many personal conflicts over land and resources. As a result, some violent deaths primarily to do with personal conflicts between individuals are often categorized as being due to political conflicts. In a polity dominated by patron-client factions, it is often impossible to distinguish personal from political conflicts and we should expect some double counting in deaths in this category and deaths in other categories (such as land related conflicts).

Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported deaths resulting from political conflicts **declined**. (The reported decline was between 48% and 41% based on two sources, Appendix B Table A.1). However, the level of insecurity remained high because amongst the dead were a number of prominent politicians in both years. They included in 2004 the opposition (Awami League) MP Ahsanullah Master, an attempt on the life of opposition leader Sheikh Hasina killed 23 people, and in 2005 the former AL minister Shah AMS Kibria was killed in a bomb attack. University teachers have also frequently been targets.

b) Arbitrary arrests. Arbitrary arrests are defined as arrests without warrant under Section 54 of the criminal code. Arbitrary and sometimes mass arrests of opposition party activists are often organized to harass or to disrupt planned agitations. Many ordinary citizens are also sometimes picked up and harassed in these sweeps.

Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported arbitrary arrests **declined**. (The reported decline was 58% in a single source, Appendix B Table A.4). All these arrests are not necessarily politically motivated as they include preventive detention of suspected criminals.

c) Injuries in political conflicts. Injuries in political conflicts are also not well-defined in a patron-client polity. Many violent conflicts that involve political factions are often primarily personal resource conflicts where political factions are mobilized. Once again, some degree of double counting with other categories of insecurity is unavoidable in these cases.

Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported injuries in all types of political conflicts **increased**. (The reported increase was between 19% and 44% based on two sources, Appendix B Table A.2 and A.3). It is noteworthy that of the total numbers reported injured in party conflicts in 2005, 57% were injured in conflicts *between* parties, but as many as 24% were injured in conflicts *within* parties, mostly within the ruling BNP. This observation is important for understanding the nature of patron-client politics and for assessing the significance of political changes happening in 2005, to which we will return later. The rest of the injuries were of party workers of all parties injured in clashes with police.

However, injuries in one particular type of political activity declined. Reported injuries during *hartals* fell in 2005 compared to 2004, even though the number of hartals (see below) increased. (The reported decline was 39% according to a single source, Appendix B Table A.5).

d) Abductions. The data does not discriminate between political abductions and criminal abductions for ransom. Often it is difficult to distinguish between the two as the abductors involved and sometimes the abducted may have both a political and/or a criminal identity. Political leaders or their family members are often targeted by rival gangs.

Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported abductions **increased**. (The reported increase was 232% according to a single source, Appendix B Table A.4).

e) Hartals. Frequent political disruptions of economic and civic life, particularly in urban centres have become common. The traditional *hartal* has now been added to by other variants such as the *oborodh* or blockade that isolates urban centres. Compared to 'normal' levels of disruption and violence, 2005 (and 2006) were particularly bad years as the leading parties failed to agree on the composition of the upcoming interim government due to take over at the end of 2006 to organize elections early in 2007. (This crisis became more entrenched in the course of 2006.)

Compared to 16 *hartals* in 2004, the number **increased** to 21 in 2005. Reported deaths during hartals **increased** from a reported figure of 0 in 2004 to either 4 or 2 in 2005 depending on the source (two sources Appendix B Table A.5). Unlike some of the other evidence based on newspaper reports with the problems discussed earlier (see Box 2), the evidence on the increase in numbers of *hartals* is clear cut as these are actual numbers not samples.

f) Bomb Blasts. In addition to the intensification of 'normal' political violence there was a worrying upsurge of bomb blasts in 2005, including coordinated attacks in August 2005 organized by an extremist Islamic group, the JMB. Attacks by this group declined in 2006 as the government took firm action, but the question remains whether the bomb blasts were a random aberration or a manifestation of structural drivers that are likely to drive further extremist violence in the near future.

Compared to 2004, reported incidents of bomb blasts in 2005 **increased**. (The reported increase was more than 12 times, single source, Appendix B Table A.7). Injuries in bomb blasts **increased** 29% and deaths **increased** 74% to 60. While the precise number of bomb blasts recorded may have missed some blasts, once again, this evidence is relatively hard as the figures cover a large proportion of the total. There is little doubt that 2005 witnessed a spike in bomb blasts compared to the previous year.

g) Opposition absence in parliament. This is a measure of the normalization of extra-parliamentary political contests, often violent. In 2005, the two major political parties were locked in political combat, but not in parliament, where the opposition made no appearance.

Compared to 2004, when the opposition was absent for 47 out of 83 days, absence in 2005 **increased** to 62 out of 62 days of parliamentary operation (Appendix B Table A.9). This too is hard evidence on the actual number of days in parliament, unlike other figures based on newspaper sampling.

h) Attacks on journalists. Available figures do not distinguish between attacks that are genuinely political attacks on free speech and attacks where journalists are themselves involved in factional affiliations and conflicts. Attacks on journalists can therefore involve some double counting with the broader category of violence in political conflicts. Comparing

2005 with 2004 we find **inconclusive trends**. Available sources give contrary directions of change for most types of insecurity affecting journalists (four sources Appendix B Table A.6). Violent deaths of journalists appear to have declined, injuries and assaults are up in some sources and down in others.

Combining the different types of data and evidence available to us, and keeping in mind that some of this data is hard data, different from the newspaper data that is far less trustworthy, *we can conclude with some confidence that 2005 witnessed a decline in political stability and a worsening of human security associated with the operation of politics and the political system.*

Critical areas where information is lacking.
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:

i) Economic effects of political insecurity on different income classes. The World Bank estimates that Bangladesh lost around 5% of its annual GDP in the 1990s due to *hartals*, and the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) report that its members lose US$18 million per day of *hartal* (Category Report A: 11). The UNDP estimates a lower figure of around 3-4% of GDP lost based on extrapolating the number of days lost as a proportion of a productive year (UNDP 2005: 32-3). However, these figures are likely to vary year-to-year as the UNDP also points out that different groups are continuously evolving coping strategies to deal with *hartals*. But we do not know how effectively vulnerable groups have coped with recent *hartals*. Moreover, while we have some tentative figures for *hartals*, we do not have any estimates for the economic losses due to other types of political insecurity. The list here is very large and includes the collection of tolls or *chanda* from different sectors and economic classes, the effects of political rent-collection on different types of service delivery, and so on. No estimates exist on the magnitude or direction of change of these costs.

ii) Risks of violence and insecurity faced by non-political actors. The bulk of the available data and evidence refers to the insecurity faced by political activists, though some figures for deaths and injuries may include unknown numbers of passers-by or innocent individuals caught up in political fights. But most deaths and injuries of non-political actors may have been missed in newspaper reports because the latter focus on high-profile conflicts and give less systematic attention to the routine violence and insecurity inflicted on ordinary citizens by the political process.

The political process involves the extraction of resources by political actors to finance political activities, or for pure predation. Parties rely heavily on local strongmen called *mastans* and compete with each other to incorporate the most powerful *mastans* within their own parties. Political 'fund-raising' frequently involves threats against those who are less than eager to pay. We have no figures that allow us to assess directions of change in the extent and intensity of insecurity faced by victims. Other victims of political activity include school and university students, whose studies are grievously affected by the whims of those who call *hartals* and *oborodhs*.

The overall picture in this category on the basis of the limited data available is one of sustained high levels of insecurity, with worsening conditions in 2005 in terms of injuries due to an intensification of conflicts, a spike in bomb blasts, greater political strife between the major parties and a total breakdown of the parliamentary part of democracy. How significant

are these changes? Do they represent the normal cyclical deterioration Bangladesh has come to expect in the run-up to elections, or are there more serious underlying drivers that should warn us of serious problems ahead?

A-2) DRIVERS

Much of the human insecurity related to politics is related to the exercise of political power through patron-client factions, the 'accumulation strategies' of patron-client factions and the intense competition between them. To explain the extent and intensity of insecurity caused by political competition, we need to understand the drivers of patron-client politics and competition, and the ways in which this manifests itself in human insecurity.


Figure 4 Drivers of politically driven human insecurity

Clientelist systems can operate with substantial differences in the degree of political stability or instability, and in the extent of the associated human insecurity. To be able to predict likely changes in these levels, we need an analysis of the drivers and effects of patron-client politics. As these are also drivers of insecurity in almost all of our other categories, more detailed attention to these drivers is warranted.

i) Low Accountability of Political Leadership. The most common explanation for the prevalence of patron-client politics in countries like Bangladesh focuses on the obvious fact that patron-client politics operates in the interests of the factions competing for political power and not in the general interest of most citizens (Figure 4). By definition, there is a low level of accountability of political representatives, which allows political power to benefit a

few instead of the many. The question really is why. The standard arguments are that low accountability is due to weak institutions of democracy and excessive centralization (Eisenstadt 1973; Médard 2002), traditional cultures of deference or deep social divisions that prevent collective action, for instance due to ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Barbone, et al. 2006). While the description of limited accountability in patron-client polities is a fact, the standard explanations of low accountability do not answer some important questions.

First, these drivers of patron-client politics provide a weak explanation for the prevalence of patron-client politics when examined in depth. While accountability in patron-client polities is low in a general sense (politics does not serve the public interest), this does not mean there is low accountability of political leaders. Faction leaders in countries like Bangladesh do not maintain themselves in power entirely or even largely through force (even though the rotation of factions in power can involve considerable violence *between* factions). Normally, leaders respond and deliver to powerful and important constituencies within their parties, and outside their parties in the country beyond. These constituencies are huge in absolute numbers. To that extent, there is already *substantial accountability* of leaders, not to society as a whole, but to the organizationally powerful groups who matter.

As soon as we recognize this fact, many of the explanations of low accountability appear deficient, because they assume that patron-client politics exists because leaders are in general unaccountable. For instance, deepening the institutions of democracy or local government will only reduce the incidence of patron-client politics if the problem in the first instance was due to a general unaccountability of leaders. But if leaders are already accountable to organizationally powerful constituencies, greater democracy and decentralization may in many cases simply reinforce the hold of these groups on the political process. Indeed, this is what we find in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, where more than a decade of democratization and decentralization has had little effect on the overall incidence of patron-client politics. This observation should warn us not to expect accountability in the general sense to improve if further feasible moves in the direction of deepening democratization and decentralization are achieved.

Similarly, there is little evidence that patron-client politics in Bangladesh or in other developing countries is based on a cultural deference to traditional elites. Rather, the relationship between patrons and clients is a very 'modern' one, where clients offer their support to patrons only to the extent that they receive appropriate payoffs. Nor is the general accountability of leaders low because of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This might exacerbate problems in some countries, but Bangladesh is a good example of persistent patron-client politics in a relatively homogenous nation-state.

But secondly, we observe no changes in the degree of accountability of the political leadership in Bangladesh that could explain the intensification of insecurity due to political competition between patron-client factions in 2005.

ii) The Economic Dependence of the Poor. An alternative explanation focuses on economic inequalities that force a large class of poor people to depend on patrons for their survival, and this in turn allows personalized power to be exercised by patrons (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). We will argue that economic underdevelopment creates strong drivers for patron-client politics, but mainly because underdevelopment makes patron-client accumulation strategies the most rational ones for political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes. The most important clients that patrons mobilize in pursuit of their accumulation strategies are

also primarily from the intermediate classes and are not the very poor, though the latter may be occasionally mobilized for some types of confrontations. The most critical clients organized by patrons in political conflicts (in *hartals* or the organization of electoral conflicts) are not the very poor but come from the intermediate classes (even though they too are often poor in absolute terms).

Intermediate class clients do not follow their patrons because of their economic dependence on them but rather because factional politics offers the most lucrative accumulation strategies for both patrons and clients. In this sense, social inequalities and the existence of the poor are not the main drivers of patron-client politics, though the availability of poor people who can occasionally be easily mobilized obviously helps political organizers. The dominant causal relationship is probably in the opposite direction, whereby the accumulation strategies unleashed by patron-client politics create new social inequalities as successful political entrepreneurs engage in primitive accumulation that can make the more successful organizers very rich in a short space of time.

An important implication is that we should not expect feasible reductions in the absolute poverty of the very poor to have a big impact on the intensity of patron-client competition. This competition is mainly led and organized by the intermediate classes. Only a redistributive strategy that targeted the intermediate classes is likely to reduce the intensity of competition within these classes and thereby have a significant effect on the intensity and violence of political conflict.

iii) Limited Fiscal Resources for Accommodating Intermediate Class Demands. An important factor that helps to explain the ubiquity of patron-client political organization in developing countries is that developing countries (like advanced ones) have large groups of well-organized and powerful individuals who demand redistribution, but (unlike advanced countries) they lack the fiscal resources that could be used to achieve political stability and integration through transparent fiscal redistributions to these groups.

Advanced countries tax between 35-50% of very large GDPs and are able to provide services and transfers that amount to significant internal redistribution. While the poor benefit from some of these transfers, public spending also satisfies the non-poor constituencies who have disproportionate political power in all countries. This is the most important reason why politically powerful constituencies in rich countries organize themselves around different positions on how to spend the national budget.

In contrast, developing countries can tax barely 10-25% of much smaller GDPs, Bangladesh being in the middle of this range. After paying the salaries of bureaucrats, most developing countries have very little left over for public goods and infrastructure, let alone for significant transfers to politically powerful groups. It is not surprising that politics in developing countries rarely focuses on the budget and indeed, much of politics happens *outside* parliament. The politically powerful satisfy their demands for redistribution through other processes, and factional organization in patron-client networks is the result.

The politically powerful in Bangladesh come from a range of 'intermediate classes' who collectively constitute around 30% of the population. Their incomes are on average lower than those of the tiny 'capitalist' elite who have enough capital to earn significant returns on their assets, and the poor who have to work for their living. The intermediate classes have some education and some capital, but for enterprising individuals from these classes, upward

mobility involves 'political accumulation' based on their political and organizational power (Khan 2000, 2005).

Political accumulation involves using their organizational muscle to make money in a variety of ways, including capturing government contracts with large margins, collecting protection money, organizing social groups including the poor for redistributive demands and capturing payoffs from the state or private enterprise as 'mediators' of these conflicts, appropriating public and private assets that are insufficiently protected, and so on. The more notorious political entrepreneurs describe themselves as *mastans*, but the latter are variants within a wide range of organizers who differ only in terms of the level of violence they use, their social respectability and the social level they operate at. Many successful businessmen and politicians at the highest levels of Bangladeshi society began their careers as political accumulators of different types, and some began their lives as *mastans*. A brief examination of their life histories shows that many political accumulators do succeed in achieving rapid upward mobility and social acceptability.

Once we recognize the importance of political accumulation strategies, we find that significant changes occurred in 2005 that upset the expectations of factions excluded from political power and this could explain the intensification of political contestation that year.

iv) Excess Supply of Potential Intermediate Class Organizers. Exacerbating the problem of limited fiscal resources are the growing demands coming from rapidly expanding intermediate classes. The intermediate classes in developing countries are typically growing faster than the demographic growth rate because of the spread of education and the upward mobility of poorer social groups who in turn demand rapid upward mobility. The annual graduates of schools, colleges and universities are far more numerous than the local productive economy can absorb, as witnessed by the numbers attempting to emigrate every year. The growing group of individuals with organizational abilities who are not able to find or create productive positions or achieve fiscal redistribution are the raw material for patron-client faction building and political competition. This is not just a Bangladeshi problem, but one that affects most developing countries. The emergence of ever new caste groupings in India as new groups assert their aspiration for upward mobility is a manifestation of this trend. However, the types of patron-client organizations and their strategies of accumulation can and do differ significantly across countries.

IMPLICATIONS OF PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS FOR HUMAN SECURITY. A political system dominated by patron-client politics will have direct effects on human security through off-budget resource capture, the capture of public resources and other political accumulation strategies. Apart from the human insecurity these accumulation processes unleash, the competition between and within factions as they seek to capture political power is a further cause of human insecurity. *Many of the aspects of human insecurity in the form of political violence, abductions, arbitrary arrests and hartals follow directly from the zero-sum calculations of factional competition rather than positive-sum economic development strategies* (Figure 4).

Political parties in the context of clientelist politics are best understood as pyramidal aggregations of factions. Despite their apparently serious ideological differences, clientelist parties share a common logic of competing to absorb the most effective sub-factions and attempting to dislocate incumbent coalitions from their positions of power. As a result, at all levels of politics in Bangladesh, and particularly at the middle and lower levels, we find an

impressive fluidity of loyalties and frequent changes in affiliations that belie the strident ideological differences that are often claimed.

The excess demand for resources and the fact that only a minority of potential organizers can be incorporated into lucrative positions of political accumulation at any one time means that the pyramidal factions enjoying power are inherently unstable. Political stability at the societal level (to the limited extent that it is achieved) depends on smooth transitions of power between factions, and factions accepting that their time in the sun is limited and they will periodically have to regroup and return.

THE 'NORMAL' FUNCTIONING OF PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS: FACTIONAL CYCLING AND MODERATE STABILITY.

The dominance of patron-client politics does not mean that human security cannot be assured at all. The 'normal' operation of patron-client politics has stabilizing factors that can keep insecurity at moderate levels. But upsetting these conditions can have serious consequences.

If enough powerful factions and their leaders are accommodated and the excluded have a reasonable probability of replacing them in the near future, the system can achieve moderate levels of security and stability. We would expect such a system to have moderate levels of political insecurity, but with cycles of insecurity corresponding to electoral cycles as excluded factions increase their activity to oust incumbents through electoral contests. But political stability can suddenly collapse if excluded groups feel that their chances of reaching positions of power in a reasonable time frame are being blocked. This is why we can have sudden and disproportionate spikes in political violence if expectations are tampered with.

The 'normal' operation of patron-client politics results in a cycling of factions and this has a restraining role on political insecurity through a number of mechanisms.

i) Natural Life Cycle of Ruling Coalitions. The normal internal dynamics of the ruling and opposition parties puts a limit on how long a ruling coalition can stay in power. The longer the ruling party has been in power, the greater the number of internal discontents who feel they have not been adequately rewarded for their support. Defections normally increase, together with the setting up of new parties and coalitions by disgruntled members of the ruling coalition. At the same time as the ruling patron-client coalition is losing key faction leaders, the coalition of excluded factions gets more united as its members are increasingly hungry for power, often joined by defectors from the ruling party, and they are increasingly focused about how to end their continued exclusion from lucrative opportunities.

ii) Voting as a Disciplining Mechanism. Voters can and do use elections to discipline incumbents when levels of expropriation exceed tolerable bounds and this can also limit political accumulation. Although elections do not necessarily translate voter preferences into policies, they do work as a disciplining mechanism, and this is why there is often a strong anti-incumbency vote in countries like Bangladesh. This is usually not because most voters care about the programmes of competing parties (that are in any case very similar), but rather because their only way of limiting the damage done by ruling factions is to occasionally 'teach them a lesson' even though in the long run, the new faction will be no better.

In passing, an analysis of patron-client politics can also explain why the hopes that 'honest politicians' may be able to break this mould are unlikely to be realized. The numbers of organizationally powerful political entrepreneurs who belong to competing factions and the

resources that are circulated within these factions are very significant, and a completely honest politician has very little chance of competing with the mobilizing capacity of 'mainstream' factions and their capacity to deliver off-budget resources to critical constituencies. This is why, unfortunately, cycling between effective (and therefore extractive) patron-client factions is often the only realistic way for individual voters to exercise some discipline over their political masters. It also explains why a genuinely honest politician (as opposed to one using the rhetoric of honesty to discredit their opponents) is so hard to find. Such politicians do occasionally emerge, and are sometimes elected, but an understanding of the structural drivers of patron-client politics helps to explain why these events are so very rare.

iii) Live and Let Live. The 'natural' cycling of factions is paradoxically a potential stabilizing factor for human security as each faction knows that other factions will eventually come to power for a while. This constrains factions from carrying out too many excesses as they know that some of their victims may one day ally with competing factions and exact revenge. However, if the faction in power believes that the new regime will expropriate their accumulation even if they limit their accumulation to tolerable levels, this can lead to more intense predatory outcomes and capital flight to overseas safe havens. However, if regular cycling is the expectation, then live and let live strategies can emerge and are potentially stabilizing in a patron-client political context.

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS

This combination of internal checks and balances can ensure that despite the absence of 'good governance' there are limits to the degree of insecurity and predation. In the best case scenario, regular cycling and effective electoral disciplining may reduce insecurity to 'low' enough levels to allow a semblance of normality in social life, and to allow moderate to high rates of economic growth (Figure 4). Indeed some of the primitive accumulation by political accumulators can also eventually contribute to productive outcomes with the gradual emergence of a productive capitalist class. In contrast, attempts by any faction to monopolize power by changing the rules of the game can result in a disproportionate spiking of violence. The descent into instability in Bangladesh during the course of 2005 is very likely linked to such an attempt by a faction within the then ruling party.

Of course, developing countries are not doomed to live with patron-client politics forever. If economic growth continues, tax takes can increase over time, and the conditions for the emergence of a viable social democracy can *eventually* emerge. However, if this normal cycling is interrupted as a result of attempts by some factions to monopolize power, the results can rapidly be very destabilizing.

Islamist Extremism: An Additional Source of Human Insecurity? A further worry from 2005 onwards was the prospect of an upsurge in Islamist violence. The spike in bomb blasts in 2005 raised the prospect of an Islamist insurgency in Bangladesh. However, we now know that in 2006, harsh action by the government against the main suspect group, the JMB, resulted in a number of key arrests and a sharp decline in the number of bomb blasts emanating from this source. What is the likely risk that the JMB may be a manifestation of deeper drivers that may re-emerge in the future?

As in many other Muslim countries, there has been a gradual increase in overt religiosity in Bangladesh over the last decade, for instance with many more middle class women wearing headscarves. But this should not be confused with the potential of violence. Lower down the

income scale, poor education contributes to obscurantism and prejudice that can sometimes take a religious character, but this too is not a sufficient driver of radical political Islam, as these conditions have existed for many years in the past.

At the political level, the Jamaat is the only major party that has an ideological following, meaning that many of its middle class members belong to it because they share its political, cultural and educational objectives rather than for standard patron-client calculations. However, while the Jamaat has a conservative educational and cultural agenda that many secular people find worrying, its popular support is relatively small.

The BNP with which it was in alliance in government in 2005 is a clientelist party and the threat this alliance poses in terms of extremism becoming more pronounced is probably exaggerated. There are dangers from a secular perspective of greater social conservatism that may be emerging from Jamaat's educational and cultural agenda, but it is important not to confuse this with an immediate threat of radical extremism that we see in some other Muslim countries.

The JMB incident appears to have been more closely connected to the normal machinations of factional politics where ruling and opposition coalitions can mobilize different sources of violence potential to further their own factional goals. Ruling coalitions frequently use powerful local factions to control other even more problematic factions. There is some evidence that the JMB performed this role for the ruling coalition, and initially assisted in controlling more troublesome freebooters in some parts of North Bengal. Their subsequent actions suggest links with more extremist ideologies although its leadership does not yet display the type of ideological commitment observed in other Muslim countries.

There is a real possibility that in the current global climate, otherwise ordinary client factions may try to identify with ideologies that are now perceived as dangerous in order to increase the 'price' they expect to exact for their collaboration with ruling factions. In these cases, the best response of ruling coalitions would be to treat these factions as any other, and resist falling into the trap of taking their declared identity too seriously.

The external danger is perhaps more serious, that networks external to Bangladesh may use these self-declared extremists to pursue agendas of disruption for their own ends. This danger is difficult to assess at the moment, but there are at least some factors that make this less likely as an immediate threat. Going against the grain of the dominant clientelist politics of Bangladesh requires not only an ideologically committed core of supporters but a core willing to accept very substantial dangers as they will directly threaten the way of life of powerful clientelist mainstream parties. It is very unlikely that the professionals and small business people who provide Jamaat with its ideological membership have any desire to challenge mainstream politics in this way, at least in the near future.

Bangladesh is different from Muslim countries like Egypt or even Pakistan where there is a wide social gap between the political and business elites and the intermediate classes. When a very significant gap emerges, large numbers of the intermediate classes find their path of upward mobility through political accumulation permanently blocked. It then becomes possible for broad sections of the intermediate classes in these countries to want to radically change a system that no longer works for them.

In contrast, Bangladeshi elites have recently emerged from a relatively undifferentiated peasant society and elites are still emerging from the intermediate classes using processes of political accumulation and patron-client politics. Many of Bangladesh's elites are not yet very far away socially or culturally from the clients they mobilize within patron-client networks. In turn, most politically powerful organizers from the intermediate classes appear to be committed to 'normal' patron-client political accumulation, which still gives most of them a chance of rapid upward mobility. These factors imply that the pool of seriously alienated intermediate class activists who could provide recruits and organizers for sustained radicalism is still *relatively* small in Bangladesh, though this may not remain true forever. It also explains why the government was able to take decisive action against the JMB with virtually no social opposition from the political classes when it became clear that the JMB's adventurism was costing the ruling coalition too much.

A-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

In this section we compare some of the evidence of changes in drivers with our assessment of the direction of change in levels of human security in this category. Some of our evidence on growing political violence in 2005, including intra-party violence within the ruling BNP coincided with the emergence of a constitutional crisis over the composition of the interim government charged with organizing the coming elections. The intense conflicts within the BNP also suggest that some factions within the party were attempting to monopolize lucrative positions at the expense of others. These facts suggest a change in some of the conditions required for an orderly cycling of factions and can explain why relatively minor factors triggered a significant intensification of conflict and a worsening of human security beyond the normal cyclical deterioration associated with elections. These internal changes in the operation of patron-client cycling are likely to be the most significant explanation for the worsening of political insecurity in 2005.


Figure 5 Human security associated with politics and the political system

Figure 5 summarizes the main aspects of our assessment of human security in this category. *We have no information on the long-run trend, so this line has a question mark attached. The deterioration reported in some of the available data is consistent with a cyclical electoral*

downturn. However, our analysis of the 'normal' operation of patron-client politics warns us that the deterioration in political insecurity that began in 2005 and that took the form of a serious constitutional crisis in 2006 is likely to be significantly worse than the normal cycle.

The possibility of Islamist extremism has also clearly emerged but the threat of escalation is probably not an immediate one. The spike in insecurity caused by the blasts attributed to the JMB may prove to be a one-off event rather than the precursor of a new trend, but this will need to be reassessed in the future. Clearly, in the new global situation Bangladesh is likely to be a target for international Islamist networks. This is a possible source of a future upsurge in insecurity in this area, more than any strong internal drivers supporting Islamist extremism. *The organization of clientelist factions and the incorporation of large elements of the intermediate classes in clientelist politics paradoxically contribute to a relative degree of security on this score* as radical changes do not seem to be supported by most socially powerful political organizers. However, this should not be taken for granted, and a significant disaffection of a large core of intermediate class political organizers could present an opportunity for extremist ideologies.

A-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Policy responses to politically driven insecurity need to address the immediate *drivers* as well as the *effects*, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups, and perhaps some of the *long-term drivers* that can cause or exacerbate this insecurity. In addition, the political process results in insecurity through a number of indirect mechanisms that will be discussed in later sections dealing with other categories of human insecurity where the political process is indirectly implicated. Possible responses are discussed in the appropriate sections.

i) Obstacles to factional cycling are primarily political. Unfortunately for donors, and for Bangladeshi civil society looking for quick solutions, the major drivers of long-term political instability in Bangladesh and the drivers of the steep worsening that began in 2005 are political and not institutional. The immediate drivers of the precipitate decline in political stability were political strategies of a faction within the ruling BNP (in power in 2005) that upset the expectation of factional cycling. Creating the appropriate conditions for moderate stability in a patron-client polity is difficult because much depends on the balance of power between factions. Stability requires a balance of power that prevents any faction attempting monopolization. If a ruling coalition or a faction within it begins to believe it can permanently exclude others, this is likely to be the beginning of an intense contestation because in fact other factions in Bangladesh are not that weak.

One implication is that Bangladesh's unique interim government system for conducting elections is an inadequate protection without the recognition by all factions that attempts at monopolization are unlikely to work. But if this recognition emerges, the need for special institutional arrangements becomes far less compelling. In India, where competing factions understand (at least most of the time) that monopolization is not a viable strategy, electoral cycling takes place without any special constitutional arrangements like Bangladesh's interim government (though at the level of state politics, federal intervention is often required to overcome occasional crises). A better understanding of these issues may save us searching for institutional cures for a fundamentally political problem.

In a context where 'normal' politics is based on patron-client factions and the use of patronage and power for political accumulation, the search for an institutional guarantee of a 'fair election' is not a simple one. All parties use muscle in their everyday political activity,

and they will use their muscle during elections. But if the opposition loses, the frustration of factions that are excluded over two electoral cycles is likely to create more than average instability. The instability is likely to be much worse if losing factions expect to be permanently excluded. Regardless of the formal economic and social policies of the parties, it seems that *the only reasonably stable outcome for human security in this system is a regular cycling of parties in power, or for the ruling party to successfully incorporate the cycling of the most important factions within itself.* This means that while stronger electoral institutions like election commissions can help, they are unlikely on their own to resolve the problem of potentially destabilizing deteriorations of political stability till the balance of power between factions prevents any faction attempting to monopolize power for too long.

Unfortunately, all major political parties in Bangladesh have at one time or another attempted to monopolize power. The hope is that political lessons will eventually be learnt by the major competing factions and 'live and let live' strategies will emerge. Only when that happens will there be a sustainable context for the viable strengthening of electoral and other institutions that can regulate the underlying political consensus.

There is an indirect policy implication of this analysis. Donors should not expect quick wins for political stability through strategies of institutional reform like decentralization or improving the efficiency of service delivery to the poor. Some institutional reforms are desirable for their own sake, and even if they may contribute to political stability, their success depends on political balances that are difficult to engineer. Indeed attempts by outsiders to engineer these outcomes are likely to be counterproductive. However, the number and strength of competing factions in Bangladesh means that it is quite likely that the cycling of factions is the normal outcome and that Bangladesh's political factions will learn to live and let live without recourse to excessive violence.

ii) Improvements in pro-poor service delivery are justified on welfare grounds but have limited impact on the drivers of politically driven human insecurity. If the primary driver of political instability is the competition between factions led by the intermediate classes, improvements in pro-poor service delivery are unlikely to have a big impact on political stability. Indeed, in Bangladesh the deterioration in political stability during 2005-06 has happened in a context of progress towards the MDGs achieved largely through significant pro-poor service delivery.

However, if there is a high level of politically driven human insecurity, pro-poor service delivery becomes even more important on welfare grounds for mitigating the negative effects on the most vulnerable. We expect substantial negative effects of politically driven insecurity on the poor through the direct effects of political expropriation, and indirectly through disruptions of markets and employment opportunities. The available data do not track the economic and security impact of political instability on the poor. For instance, we do not know if *hartals* have more significant effects on the urban poor, on agricultural producers whose markets are disrupted, or on the direct victims of violence. Tracking the effects of political instability on the poor through surveys will allow targeted responses to be developed.

iii) Exaggerating the threat of Islamist radicalism is likely to be counterproductive. There is little evidence so far of strong local drivers of Islamist radicalism. As a mainstream clientelist party, the BNP government in power in 2005 was probably being truthful in strenuously denying that it had a hidden fundamentalist agenda in the political strategies it

followed. *While Bangladesh is likely to be of interest for international Islamist networks, exaggerating the immediate threat is likely to be counterproductive as it may actually encourage the emergence of factions asserting their adherence to 'proscribed' ideologies and international networks as a strategy of extracting a high price for accommodation.* If enough factions begin to follow these strategies for short term gains, this could end up having serious unintended long term effects.

iv) Improvements in economic opportunities for intermediate classes are likely to significantly reduce political instability in the long term. The creation of jobs and legitimate investment and accumulation opportunities targeted towards the intermediate (primarily lower middle) classes, and particularly for young males in these income classes, is likely to have a significant impact on political insecurity, and particularly in vulnerable urban areas. The creation of jobs for relatively not-so-poor males appears to go against the pro-poor policy priorities of donors. But if employment and income improvement opportunities of these classes are critical for broader security that affects the poor, a balance has to be found between immediate pro-poor priorities and programmes that are likely to have significant impacts on everyone's security in the medium to long run.

For instance, something as trivial as the lack of adequate accommodation for university students (in public universities) induces the majority of enterprising and organizationally capable students to affiliate with political factions that can use political power to free up student accommodation for them. This is a type of off-budget transfer that introduces young people to factional politics. These students are then obliged to participate in the broader political strategies of competing factions. If the fiscal space allowed the government to provide accommodation for all students, this would have a huge impact on political stability through direct and indirect mechanisms. Alternatively, we could explore public-private partnerships that could provide affordable (that is very cheap) accommodation for students, but that too requires fiscal contributions. These are long term issues, but progress in this area is likely to have the biggest eventual impact on political stability and security.

B.   HUMAN INSECURITY RESULTING FROM CONFLICTS OVER LAND AND ASSETS.

Bangladesh is still a largely agricultural country in terms of employment, it is severely land-poor and the incidence of landlessness is rising. Conflicts over land and assets are very widespread and the source of considerable insecurity and violence.

B-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
There are no data on annual levels of land and property related conflicts and insecurity, and none for 2005 that could be compared with earlier years or serve as a benchmark for future comparisons. Thus, for this category we could not assess likely level changes. However, monitoring human insecurity in this area is important given that insecurity associated with access to or ownership of land and assets was identified by many respondents to our consultation as an important if not the most important source of human insecurity in terms of scale and effects on the poor.

These observations are corroborated by Bangladesh's poor score on the closely related issue of property right stability in assessments of good governance (Kaufmann, et al. 2005). However, these indicators only tell us how far away Bangladesh was from the average performance (based largely on subjective assessments). As a result, changes in these indicators only tell us how the distance away from the average has changed, and not necessarily the actual direction of change within Bangladesh over time.

The available data do not allow us to identify either long-term trends or short-term cyclical variations in land and asset-related human insecurity with any confidence, but the evidence is unequivocal in suggesting high levels of insecurity associated with land and asset conflicts.

i) Rural land grabbing, land-related violence and 'churning'. Land grabbing by the more powerful has always been a feature of rural Bangladesh. This includes grabbing the land not only of the relatively weak, but also lands that are public property, including *khas* land earmarked for the poor, publicly owned water bodies and parts of rivers rich in fish. Rural land-grabbers often employ gangs of *lathials* (literally stick-wielding thugs) for this purpose and stories occasionally make it to the press of gruesome violence in these conflicts.

Estimates suggest that around a third of all *khas* land has been illegally appropriated (2 sources Appendix B Table B.1). This is an aggregate figure and does not allow us to assess recent trends, but it suggests significant levels of land grabbing.

Surveys of land holdings show high levels of market and non-market transfers of rural land. However, the same data shows that despite significant levels of land and asset grabbing, land concentration is not happening because the process of appropriation and loss is continuous and affects *all classes* of landholding (Mahbub Ullah 1996; Khan 2004). The net effect of all the land transfers is therefore often described as 'churning'. This, together with demographic growth and the land subdivision that happens when families grow, results in complex outcomes. There is *a)* a growth in landlessness, but also *b)* a growth in the share of marginal and small farms (under 2.5 acres), and *c)* a *decline* in the share of medium to large farms (over 2.5 and over 7.5 acres) (Appendix B Table B.10).

Thus, Bangladesh appears to have **high levels** of land grabbing (though we cannot quantify the share of land affected or recent trends), but the turmoil does not lead to the emergence of

a class of middle to large farmers who could have led a drive into higher productivity farming.

ii) Urban primitive accumulation. At the same time, rapid economic development in and around urban centres has pushed some land values through the roof with high double digit rates of annual price appreciation. This has brought in bigger speculators who deploy political power, *mastans,* and grand corruption to capture land that is rapidly appreciating in value. The victims here are often squatters and slum dwellers, but also middle class owners whose incomes (to buy protection) are not commensurate with the new values of their land. Much of the unplanned development in and around urban centres (that in turn often results in the blocking of drainage canals) happens because of these grabs. Non-market transfers that result in asset capture by the rich is a form of primitive accumulation. As a result, although hard data is not available, the land grabbing processes in these areas are more likely to result in land concentration, and are closely connected to the anarchic processes of development in urban areas.

There is qualitative evidence of powerful political figures capturing high-value land near urban centres. Examples include the capture of tracts of land in areas near Dhaka, such as Gazipur, Narayanganj and Ashulia (Category report B, boxes 1-5). Our hunch, which we can only assert with limited confidence, based on this type of qualitative evidence is that primitive accumulation is **increasing** in and around urban areas.

iii) Land right are widely contested and protected through informal mechanisms. The total number of land related cases currently in court in 2004 is estimated at between 800,000 and 3,200,000, and the average time of completion for cases is 9.5 years (2 sources Appendix B Table B.8). This is the aggregate not the annual figure of new cases. The source with the larger estimate also estimates that 150 million people are indirectly involved in these cases (including family members), more than the total population because many households are involved in multiple cases. We do not know the percentage of the total population involved in land and asset related litigation or the share of total cases that are land cases, but these figures suggest that land disputes are ubiquitous.

Land disputes are often managed through informal political processes involving *mastans* who provide protection for a fee to those who can afford it and help to 'resolve' land disputes between relatives and neighbours, often in favour of those who can pay more or who are better connected. These activities can create new insecurities (as well as sometimes resolving conflicts) because *mastans* have strong incentives to seek out and exacerbate dormant problems based on conflicting land records or family disputes. Again, the available evidence suggests **high levels** of contestation but it is difficult to discern trends or cycles.

Critical areas where information is lacking.
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:

i) The impact of land-related violence on different vulnerable groups. There is no data that looks at the impact of land-related violence on people of different income classes and asset holdings. While the data on churning show that all income and asset classes are vulnerable to land grabbing, the poor may be much more vulnerable to *violence*, and some regions may be more vulnerable than others. We expect substantial class and regional differences given the differences in types of landholdings, and the ability of different classes to protect themselves.

ii) Impacts on the income and welfare of different groups. Similarly, the economic effects of land and asset contests may be very different for different income classes and in different regions.

iii) The proportions of landholdings affected. To track changes in levels of contestation across years, we need to have estimates of the proportions of different types of landholdings affected by contestation. The different types of landholdings could be defined by size of holding, region, and location never urban centres.

B-2) DRIVERS

There are a number of important drivers of insecurity in this category. Some are closely related to drivers of insecurity in other categories, including in particular, insecurities associated with the political process.


Figure 6 Drivers of Insecurity driven by land and asset conflicts

i) Political Drivers. In the previous section we looked at the drivers of political accumulation. Political accumulators, using their capacity to organize local factions, generally target weakly protected assets, particularly land, either for grabbing or to extract protection money. All the drivers discussed in section A lie behind these processes.

ii) Structural problem of low productivity assets. Land grabbing is a viable strategy for political factions because land and assets are weakly protected in developing countries where current owners typically have low productivity and do not generate the economic surpluses to pay for the protection of their assets, either through taxes or privately. This is a structural problem that cannot be effectively addressed till economic development allows most asset owners to contribute towards effective property right protection as a 'public good'.

iii) Administrative and Judicial Weaknesses. The weakness and culpability of the administrative and judicial systems can make property right conflicts much worse than they would otherwise have been. The police, the judiciary and bureaucrats in land record offices and elsewhere often collude with the politically powerful or act on their own initiative to exploit conflicts between neighbours and relatives to extract their resources or pervert the course of justice in return for appropriate payoffs. Figure 6 summarizes these drivers.

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS
i) Factional competition. Factional cycling constrains excessive appropriation as expropriators are aware that they may induce retaliation in the near future. Those who are threatened by appropriation can also limit damage if they can find competing factions willing to protect them for a relatively low price. The evidence of churning, particularly in rural areas, and the ability of many small holders of land to hold on to their assets supports this interpretation.

ii) Rising land values. The rise in land values can upset this equilibrium by raising the stakes for land grabbing and creating strong incentives for ruling coalitions to try and monopolize political power. While this is likely to raise the intensity of contestation for a while, once land and assets pass into the hands of high productivity users who can afford to pay for their protection, contestation is likely to steeply decline. It is the interim period of intense contestation that is a source of concern, and given the high value of the prize, the faction or individual that can appropriate enough high value assets can permanently alter the balance of power. This raises the stakes in factional competition and can make conflict more violent.

B-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

By combining available evidence with an analysis of drivers we can suggest some tentative conclusions that need to be further evaluated with better data in the future. The levels of insecurity in this category are high and there is some evidence that new conflicts and associated insecurities are intensifying in high-value urban and semi-urban areas with rapidly rising land values. Economic cycles in land conflicts are more difficult to identify as there are opposing tendencies here: economic downturns can increase the intensity of conflict in rural areas, but upturns can accelerate the rate of price appreciation and therefore conflicts over economically valuable land.

Our tentative assessment is therefore of a downward trend in human security in this category, in Figure 7, but we do not have much evidence for this or for the rate of decline and therefore we have a largish question mark on the trend line. We know that the level of human security in this area is low, and the likely long-term trend is based on our analysis of drivers. The trend may paradoxically be linked to high rates of economic growth and rising land values.


Figure 7 Human security associated with land and asset conflicts

B-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

i) Institutional capacities for across-the-board security of property rights will only develop slowly. A secure system of property rights is a public good, not a free good. It requires substantial public expenditure in institutions that can provide record-keeping, conflict resolution and enforcement. The weak administrative and judicial capacities of developing countries have rightly attracted the attention of governance reformers. However, while progress on these institutional capacities can begin, we cannot expect rapid progress. This is because the average productivity of the developing economy is low by definition, and therefore tax revenues are also low and the feasible increases in expenditure on stabilizing property rights are limited. We cannot realistically expect well-defined property rights and low transaction costs for the whole economy *before* economic development has reached a minimum level.

ii) Important to focus on institutional capacities for reducing insecurity of rights critical for economic growth and reducing social vulnerability. While securing property rights

across the board is not a realistic immediate policy, there are pragmatic steps that governments can take to significantly reduce insecurity in critical areas. These areas have to be selected through a process of dialogue and negotiation, but will incorporate two types of concerns. Some rights may be targeted for protection because of the vulnerability or poverty of the affected population. Other rights may be targeted because of the critical economic importance of some sectors.

For instance, the growing incidence of primitive accumulation of valuable land is partly driven by the fact that genuine developers find it very difficult to acquire land that has poorly defined rights and multiple and competing claims over fragmented plots. The transaction costs of legal purchases are therefore very high. Land grabbers and *mastans* respond to these real problems, but they also make huge profits and are engaged in expropriation on their own account.

An example where institutional capacities could be developed to make these critical economic transactions less subject to insecurity would be to establish a strong land development agency to facilitate the acquisition of land for development in a more transparent way. The aim would be to respond to industrial or residential land use requirements by responding to owners and individuals claiming an interest in the land in question, and using fast-tracked hearings to resolve competing claims. The strategy could also protect the vulnerable by requiring compensation for squatters if the land is already occupied. Much of the insecurity faced by squatters is associated with violent evictions from land with no compensation. Sellers could get an auction price of the land after paying for the costs of resolving competing claims and compensations. But they would very likely get a higher price for their land through this mechanism than if they had to deal with *mastans* or face political expropriation. On the other hand, potential developers may also find that they have to pay less than what they would otherwise have paid *mastans* to acquire the land using force, political connections and violence.

We can expect attempts by the politically powerful to capture such an agency. But reform is most likely to work if a limited number of critical agencies are prioritized by reformers, if they have narrow and well-defined remits, and are led by enterprising and public-spirited individuals. There will inevitably be conflicts over land transactions in a land-scarce economy but if these conflicts are addressed in an institutionalized way, the insecurity in this sub-category can decline, and in this case, directly contribute to economic development.

iii) Managing the stresses of development. The long-run solution to property right instability and conflicts is to create the fiscal space to pay for effective property right protection. But paradoxically, economic progress can have contrary effects in the short to medium-run. Rapid development can itself create an intensification of conflicts over the ownership of assets enjoying rapid value appreciation. An awareness of these tensions is critical for national policy-makers and donors to manage the transition and to devise interim solutions that can manage the intensification of conflicts in the short run.

C. HUMAN INSECURITY ASSOCIATED WITH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

Developing countries like Bangladesh typically perform very poorly in broad areas of administrative and judicial governance. The operation (or otherwise) of the administrative and judicial systems in turn directly and indirectly affects human security as these systems are supposed to deliver critical protection and services that are essential for guaranteeing security.

C-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

i) Corruption. Corruption refers to many different types of illegal self-seeking activities by public officials. We know that different types of corruption have different effects (Khan 2006), but in general corruption has significant negative effects on the delivery of public goods including justice. From the perspective of human security, bureaucratic and judicial corruption creates large costs and uncertainties in the access to public goods of all types including justice. Bangladesh continued to appear at the bottom of the TI country rankings for corruption (every year from 2001 to 2005). However, this is a perception based ranking and has serious methodological limitations in making international comparisons, and particularly for tracking corruption over time in a single country. More importantly, it does not help us to track year to year changes in the extent and incidence of different *types* of corruption affecting human security within Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that corruption has been at a **high level** in Bangladesh's recent history.

ii) Extra-judicial killings. A particularly severe aspect of insecurity is the likelihood of extra-judicial killings by the administrative system. In particular, this includes deaths in government custody and 'cross-fire', where suspected criminals die ostensibly trying to resist arrest. In the past these killings mainly involved the police, but in recent years, the activities of RAB have added to this threat. Comparing 2005 with 2004, extra-judicial killings **increased.** Police killings increased by between 8% and 161%, RAB killings increased by between 41% and 75%, (three sources in each case, Appendix B Table C.1). The police were responsible for around two-thirds of the total. Paradoxically, the worsening of insecurity in this sub-category was associated with general public approval of RAB activities, and a widely-based perception that security had improved in terms of protection from crime (see also later discussion on crime).

iii) Arbitrary arrests by police and RAB. The Special Powers Act 1974 gives law enforcing agencies considerable latitude in arresting almost anyone, including occasionally, the political opposition. No government has been able to resist the temptation of using law enforcing agencies to pursue their own political goals. In addition, law enforcing agencies typically cut corners in pursuing criminals, sometimes handing out rough justice, which is often also appreciated by the local population. RAB's own published data reports that they arrested a total of 4872 people in 2005, of whom only 7% had warrants against them, 15% were charged with 'other' charges and 4% were arrested under the Special Powers Act 1974 (Appendix B Table C.2). We do not have figures to assess trends, but we can conclude that a **high proportion** of arrests are likely to be arbitrary in the sense that they are based on unknown evidence.

iv) Inefficiency of judicial system and miscarriages of justice. Widespread anecdotal and case study evidence shows problems in the judicial system including some evidence of miscarriages of justice. The slowness of the judicial process has a big impact on insecurity in all sectors. For instance, the Bangladesh Mahila Parishad reports that two to five years are

required to settle cases of violence against women. Very obvious miscarriages of justice often take years to correct (see for instance Box 2 in Category Report C).

Critical areas where information is lacking.
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:

i) Impact of extractive demands by police and other public officials on different income classes. The trends in the proportion of individuals affected and the proportions of their incomes that are lost would be required to assess the impact of predatory corruption on vulnerable groups.

ii) Weak information on arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings. Sample surveys are not the best way to get comparable information on arbitrary arrests or extra-judicial killings (because the numbers are small relative to Bangladesh's population), but neither are collations of newspaper reports. The precedent established by RAB in publishing its own figures should be used to encourage agencies like the police to make their figures public. Our researchers were occasionally able to get figures for different categories of crimes from the police so we know figures exist and are more extensive than figures coming from the press (see Box 2). Official figures, however weak, would be a more consistent indication of annual changes compared to newspaper reports (which could serve as a secondary check).

C-2) DRIVERS
i) Pressures and incentives created by political accumulation strategies. In many but not all cases of bureaucratic and judicial failure, the root cause is pressure and incentives created by the political accumulation strategies of patron-client factions. Political accumulation is often impossible without the assistance or at least the deliberate inactivity of the police, local bureaucrats or the judiciary. Given the very significant resources generated through these processes, the incentives for participation on the part of the administrative and judicial bureaucracy are difficult to resist. Moreover, an individual bureaucrat opting out of these processes could threaten to block accumulation strategies of other politicians and bureaucrats and could therefore bring about their removal or relocation to less attractive areas.

ii) Fiscal constraints prevent adequate financing of public goods. Fiscal constraints in developing countries can prevent the provision of infrastructure and salaries for effective public good provision, creating incentives for informal rationing through corruption and nepotism.

iii) Limited accountability of public officials. Low levels of accountability allow bureaucrats, judges, policemen and others to engage in extraction from the public with impunity. This too is a contributory factor, but the question is whether the low level of accountability is independent of the other two drivers or derived from them. Given the low levels of resourcing and the political protection enjoyed by officials participating in patron-client accumulation strategies, it may be difficult to achieve greater accountability for public officials without changes in the other drivers.

In theory, some improvements may be possible. In particular, a number of archaic laws that protect public officials, such as the Official Secrets Act of 1931 and the Contempt of Court Act of 1938 could be revisited. Similarly, the Special Powers Act of 1974 is regularly misused. The problem is that such reforms are again unlikely given the usefulness of these powers to ruling factions.

Figure 8 Drivers of insecurity associated with administrative and judicial systems

The critical drivers are summarized in Figure 8, which identifies the critical drivers where changes can exacerbate or constrain insecurity.

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS

i) Disciplining effect of elections and direct public action. While elections can limit the damage done by ruling factions, the effects on the administrative and judicial system can be complex. The emergent practice in Bangladesh is for the top bureaucracy to be replaced by incoming governments. This imposes some discipline on the bureaucracy in the same way that political competition can constrain political factions. On the other hand, the limited time horizon of top bureaucrats can also induce them to be more predatory. The threat of public action in the form of protests or even violence against poor service delivery or arbitrary actions has also played an occasional constraining role on the bureaucracy.

In addition, the competition between political factions means that individuals, particularly middle class ones, can mobilize contacts in competing factions (sometimes within the same party) to put pressure on bureaucrats or the police to limit the damage they would otherwise suffer, even without power changing at the top.

ii) Very intense political competition can exacerbate administrative insecurity. The evidence also suggests that very intense competition between factions can lead to more intense efforts by different parties to politicize the administration and the judiciary. During 2005 this was an important driver of increased insecurity.

A high-level example of this is the growing politicization of the judiciary partly as a consequence of the 12th Amendment setting up the constitutional provisions for caretaker administrations in Bangladesh. The constitutional rule is that the head of the caretaker

government is to be the last retired Chief Justice, creating even stronger incentives for incumbent parties to appoint judges on a partisan basis. This experience also shows the limitations of trying to solve political problems by administrative means.

iii) Authoritarian institutional responses: The RAB phenomenon. Occasionally in Bangladesh, the fragmentation of factions and the violence unleashed by their accumulation strategies provokes authoritarian responses by ruling groups to rein in the most anarchic, often within their own parties or coalitions. This history goes back to the *Rakkhi Bahini* set up by Mujib, and it is possible to see military takeovers as extreme variants on this theme. Initial public reactions to these exercises have often been positive, but not always.

The public response to RAB has been positive, despite many cases of extra-legal killings and the use of Special Powers of arrest. The logic is that these things happen anyway, but at least with RAB there has been a perception that the activity of many *mastans* and criminal gangs has become more subdued, and the perception is that the security situation with respect to crime has improved.

But Bangladeshi history also tells us that while a new agency with new powers can for a time operate outside the drivers of administrative insecurity described in Figure 8 this is always a temporary phenomenon. Sooner or later, these drivers ensure that the new agency begins to behave like any other. Indeed, this also happened to the military shortly after coming to power on a number of occasions in the seventies and eighties. The danger is that we may end up with a faction or series of factions in RAB who engage in standard factional accumulation strategies, but now armed with special powers.

C-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

We have no credible data to identify long-term trends in this category. The available evidence and evidence on the drivers suggests that there is a moderate to low level of human security in this category. Some long-run observations are worrying. The quality and competence of top bureaucrats appears to have gradually declined over the last three decades. The public services have found it difficult to compete with NGOs and the private sector in attracting the best candidates. As the numbers of people who are only interested in factional accumulation strategies grows within an organization, cumulative causation can rapidly set in driving out the rest. This suggests the possibility of a negative trend over time that we need to track carefully with better data.

In addition, there is likely to be an electoral cycle in this insecurity, given its close connection with political drivers and the politicization of the administration. The intensification of political competition in the run-up to elections is likely to result in an intensification of politicization and involve the administration in actions like arbitrary arrests and intensified accumulation strategies that result in a deterioration of security.

Figure 9 summarizes our assessment. *We have no information on the long-run trend, so this line has a question mark attached. The deterioration reported in some of the available data is consistent with a cyclical electoral downturn. However, the deterioration associated with RAB is an exceptional phenomenon as discussed earlier. The electoral deterioration is likely to be worse in 2005-06 given our earlier analysis of the disruption of 'normal' patron-client politics.*


Figure 9 Human Security associated with the administrative and judicial systems

Although the operation of RAB has met with broad popular support so far, we would assess its actions as a source of deteriorating human security in this category. The possible and separate improvement in security as a result of a reduction in crime will be discussed later.

C-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

i) Drivers of political competition are critical. All of the policies aimed at the drivers of insecurity associated with politics are relevant here because patron-client accumulation strategies are an important driver of insecurity in this category. Patron-client competition can be sustained at moderate levels of insecurity, and the realistic option for most developing countries is to grope towards a 'live and let live' understanding between competing political factions as they pursue their political accumulation strategies.

ii) Importance of improving the quality of public personnel. Strengthening the quality and pay of personnel in public service, at least in critical agencies must be an important goal. The public services have to recreate a strong public service tradition and meritocratic elitism in appointments. Having bigger budgets to pay middle and top bureaucrat proper salaries would obviously help, bringing to the fore once again issues of taxation and fiscal space.

iii) Improving accountability in achievable and realistic ways. Greater transparency and the removal of laws protecting official secrecy, and greater accountability of public officials would be helpful, but radical improvements are unlikely given the political drivers that are in turn underpinned by political accumulation strategies. However, focused reforms can make a small difference and should be pursued. For instance, setting time limits before which retiring

bureaucrats and judges are not allowed to join political parties may help to break down the most obvious factional links that senior bureaucrats cultivate as their retirement approaches.

iv) Decentralization and devolution are not necessarily panaceas. There is a common perception that decentralization and/or devolution may help to counter some of the insecurities in this category by improving the accountability of public servants. However, the jury is still out on the effects of decentralization and devolution on the overall insecurity associated with administrative and judicial failures. In particular, it is not clear how decentralization or devolution would change the drivers discussed in Figure 8. Factional competition, political accumulation strategies and the absence of fiscal resources to meet the redistributive demands of the organizationally powerful are just as strong if not stronger at lower levels of the political and administrative structure. We need to track with hard evidence whether the levels of devolution and decentralization that have already been achieved are resulting in greater human security in Bangladesh or simply a decentralization of violence and insecurity to lower levels of society.

On the other hand, there are some issues where reform would help that are discussed in connection with decentralization but could be addressed independently. For instance, the construction of more courts, clinics and other service delivery facilities in smaller towns will certainly improve access to services and reduce aspects of insecurity associated with administrative and judicial failures. These changes are, however, strongly opposed by middle class administrative and judicial officers who do not want to spend time in the boondocks. Formally, an expansion of these facilities could happen within the existing administrative structure simply by constructing multiple facilities at the same tier of administration, for instance by having sittings of the High Court at multiple locations.

v) Focusing on critical agencies is likely to be more fruitful compared to across-the-board governance reforms. Given the overall fiscal constraints, it is not possible to feasibly improve the quality of the bureaucracy or judiciary across the board. Policy to improve the quality of the administration and judiciary is more likely to succeed if it focuses on a few critical areas where the impact of human insecurity is higher than average.

Critical agencies can be defined in terms of areas where a high level of human insecurity is particularly damaging in terms of its **economic** or **social effects**. In our earlier discussion we argued that urban land-related conflicts may be one such area where insecurity has a disproportionate effect on economic development and we suggested that an effective land development agency may therefore have a high payoff in terms of limiting very damaging insecurity. Focusing scarce reform efforts and personnel in critical agencies may be the most realistic way of targeting the most serious insecurities.

Similarly, attention could be focused on agencies that addressed the most critical social concerns of vulnerable group insecurity. One of our conclusions is that identifying the most vulnerable aspects of non-economic insecurity is difficult on the basis of the available data.

In a very different way, the RAB is another agency that arguably responds to social concerns about human insecurity caused by crime and political factionalism crossing certain bounds. Even if we accept part of this argument, in all of these cases, early attention to recruitment and pay may prevent or delay the onset of absorption of critical agencies into factional political accumulation strategies.

D. VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN.

Apart from the economic discrimination faced by women in terms of jobs and incomes, women in Bangladesh face a very restricted social space defined by culture. They also face a range of types of violence and discrimination, some very horrific like acid throwing, and others like trafficking that are common to other developing countries. There are a wide range of issues relevant for human insecurity in this category. There is a lot of available data that show high levels of insecurity but its quality is poor (based mostly on newspaper scanning), it shows different directions of change for the same sub-categories depending on the reporting agency, and it is difficult to assert any trends with confidence.

D-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

i) Violence, both domestic and otherwise. For most sub-categories, the data from different agencies show conflicting directions of change in 2005 compared to 2004.

      a) Custodial violence. This refers to reports of violence against women including rape and sexual assault while in police or judicial custody. *Up.* Up 80% and 409% in two sources (Appendix B Figure D.7).

      b) Domestic violence. *Unclear direction of change.* Down by 33% and 48% in two sources and up by 62% in a third source (Appendix B Figure D.1). The reported category is 'Physical Torture', which is a common term in Bangladesh for referring to (mainly) domestic violence.

      c) Female murders. *Unclear direction of change.* Down 67% in one source and up 13% and 196% in two sources (Appendix B Table D.5).

      d) Dowry related violence. *Unclear direction of change.* Down between 2% and 4% in two sources and up by between 3% and 41% in three sources (Appendix B Table D.2).

      e) Rape. *Down?* Down by between 13% and 24% in 4 sources but with a small recorded increase of 1% in one source. (Appendix B Table D.3)

      f) Acid violence. *Down.* (between 36% and 46%, five sources Appendix B Table D.4). Although most victims are women, our sources include male victims in the aggregate figures.

ii) Female Suicide as an indicator of hidden violence and repression. *Unclear direction of change.* Down 12% and 99% in two sources and up 17% in another source (Appendix B Table D.5).

iii) Kidnappings and abductions. There is a widespread perception that this is a growing problem. Middle class and lower middle class parents of girls face daily fears, particularly if their children are perceived to be good-looking. *Unclear direction of change.* Down 8% and 26% in two sources and up 18% in third source (Appendix B Figure D.3).

iv) Trafficking of women and prostitution. There is certainly greater media awareness of these problems, and with the associated problem of disease and AIDS. *Unclear direction of change.* Reported cases of trafficking up 14% and 715% in two sources and down 29% in a third source (Appendix B Figure D.4).

v) Restrictions of the 'social space' available to women. This refers to social restrictions beyond the restrictions set by differential economic opportunities open to women. One measure of this is the incidence of fatwa-based punishments against women. *Up.* Up between 17% and 31% (two sources, Appendix B Figure D.5). Fatwa based punishments are often barbaric and can involve for instance flogging and stoning for 'crimes' such as alleged extra-marital relationships.

Critical areas where information is lacking.
The available data in this category bring out most clearly the dangers of relying on newspaper reports to collect data that can inform policy on human security (see also Box 2). The data indicate wildly different magnitudes *and* directions of changes across sources and are in any case not scalable to identify levels of risk.

Data is also missing to measure the impact of violence and discrimination of each type on women in *different income classes*.

D-2) DRIVERS
A very wide range of drivers are potentially at play here. Indeed, variants of discrimination and violence against women can persist in more developed and open economies with higher levels of education and more liberal cultures. We focus on drivers that are particularly applicable for a developing country like Bangladesh.

i) Limited economic opportunities. The absence of employment opportunities for women is an important constraint limiting women's social opportunities and therefore their bargaining power in legal and cultural debates. The dramatic growth of employment of poor women in the garment industry is often criticized for exploitation and poor conditions but in fact it has contributed to opening up the social options for a broad class of women and made some progressive social changes more likely. Female employment tripled in the 1990s to reach 9.1 million in 2000, compared to a 10% increase in male employment over the same period to 33.6 million.

A continued rapid growth in female employment is highly desirable, with an onus on policy-makers to regulate working conditions and encourage productivity and thereby wage growth in sectors employing women. But in the short run, rapid growth in female employment can also spark off a conservative backlash by traditionalists worried about values and ways of life. Managing these concerns is much easier if employment is growing across the economy.

ii) Discriminatory Laws. The legal situation is also a cause for concern. In some areas there are already strong legal sanctions protecting women, including the death penalty for acid throwing and abductions, and for attempted murders of women for dowry. Together with the activity of campaigning groups and public awareness, there is some evidence that these measures are reducing the scale of acid throwing. In other areas, the law is biased against women, particularly in areas of inheritance and divorce. These biases have ramifications beyond their immediate effects as they establish women and men as having different sets of legal rights.

iii) Cultures and values. The traditional cultural and religious context also sets limits to the range of possible reforms that are possible, particularly in the legal sphere. For instance, although Bangladesh has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, it recorded reservations on articles 2 and 16.1(c) which were thought to be in contradiction with *shariah* law. This means that laws regarding divorce, child custody, maintenance and inheritance can continue to be discriminatory. At the same time, we know from our own history that *shariah* law is not an immutable obstacle. One of the most radical jumps in women's rights in terms of family law happened in Bangladesh when it was part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a result of the introduction of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in 1961. This ordinance radically improved the protection available

to women in family law cases. While cultures and values do constrain change, they are not immutable. But they are best changed through a process of creating new progressive facts on the ground rather than through head on confrontations.


Figure 10 Drivers of Violence and Discrimination against Women

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS

Figure 10 summarizes these drivers. Some of these drivers have moved in a positive direction over the last two decades, in particular employment opportunities for women. In addition, powerful women's organizations and NGOs have played a positive role in Bangladesh, creating public opinion and putting pressure on the state in areas such as education for girls where Bangladesh has made very good progress. On the negative side, the new global environment and polarization has not helped. Reformists in Muslim countries find it more difficult to identify with reform agendas that can be presented as anti-Muslim because the "you are either with us or against us" challenge is used on both sides of the divide.

Given the available evidence and what we know of changes in drivers we are unable to identify long-term trends or cycles of violence and insecurity in this category. Qualitative and anecdotal evidence tells us that the level of insecurity is moderate to high, but we have no scalable data to establish how high the insecurity is or how it is changing over time. The contradictory directions of change indicated in the available data are also most frustrating.

D-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

This frustrating conclusion is summarized in Figure 11, which shows we lack the information to deduce either the level or slope of the trend line. Not only is the immediate evidence contradictory, the drivers in this case could be responsible for a moderate positive or negative trend and we cannot credibly identify a direction of change in the trend or comment on how serious the insecurity is in this category on any objective scale. This reiterates the need for better evidence and data collection.

Figure 11 Violence and discrimination against women

D-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

i) Sustaining employment and wage growth. Sustaining growth in labour-intensive sectors where poor women can find employment is vital. The labour problems in 2006 in some garment factories also show the importance of proper labour regulations and the need to encourage and achieve productivity growth.

ii) Education and culture. Countering the conservative educational agenda of some religious groups is best done by finding and managing the resources to set up high-quality secular educational establishments at all levels. Liberals in Bangladesh have been too ready to blame external sources of funding for *madrasas* without asking why despite much more aid coming to Bangladesh from western sources, the quality of education in secular schools has remained poor regardless of the party in power.

iii) Addressing legal discrimination issues. In the longer run, the legal discrimination against women in a number of fields has to be addressed. The historical evidence is that, paradoxically, effective reforms in these areas in conservative cultures are as or more likely to be achieved by strong reformist centre-right parties as centre-left ones. Centre-left parties are often too concerned to protect their flanks to engage in controversial reforms in a conservative culture. In Bangladesh, however, neither the BNP nor the Awami League has so far taken a lead in difficult reforms in this area.

E. VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND OTHER COMMUNITY GROUPS.

Members of ethnic, religious and other community groups are likely to face additional insecurities due to their greater vulnerability and because extremist ideological political factions can target them. We include in this category the insecurities faced by Bangladesh's Hindu minority (10.5% of its population), the indigenous population (between 1 to 2% of the population) concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts but with a presence in a number of other areas, the Ahmadiyya community (precise numbers unavailable), and other social groups like the Hijras. There are around 45 different ethnic minority groups living in Bangladesh. Many of the insecurities faced by these groups are very similar to those faced by the majority community with the added difference that smaller communities are more vulnerable, have fewer points of contact with competing factions in the political parties and administration to defend themselves, and therefore are often seen as soft targets for the land appropriation and other extractive strategies of political accumulators. A separate and more serious problem that occasionally emerges is that minorities can become victims of ideologically or politically motivated hate crimes.

E-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

i) Deaths attributable to inter-community violence. Violent deaths in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) were *down* in 2005 compared to 2004 by 39% to 25 deaths according to a single source (Appendix B Table E.10). For the Hindu community, we have reports of 12 deaths in 2005 (no figures available for 2004) (Appendix B Table E.4). The absolute numbers of deaths for the Hindu community are low given the size of this community and data cannot be scaled up to indicate the level of risk faced by the Hindu community nationally (see Box 2). But a comparison with deaths during the run-up to the 2001 election reported by the same agency suggests a decline in the levels of violence. In that election year 17 deaths were reported (Appendix B Table E.7). However, the next election is in 2007, so we need to assess levels of violence in late 2006 and early 2007 to see if the public outcry against the violence faced by the Hindu community in 2001 has had an effect. We also need to be able to compare the cyclical decline in the security of the Hindu community during elections with the general decline in security faced by the entire population during elections to see if the Hindu community are subject to *additional* insecurities. The available data do not allow us to make this assessment.

To assess the extra risk faced by minority groups, we should exclude deaths due to conflicts where the ethnic or religious identity of the victim was accidental. In practice this distinction may be difficult to make, so an alternative strategy would be to compare the incidence of all violent deaths in a minority community group with the incidence in the average population. A difference between the two proportions would indicate a higher insecurity facing particular communities. To do this we would need to have data on *all* violent deaths suffered by different communities (and not just those assessed by newspapers as being due to communal violence) to compare with the figure for the overall population.

ii) Injuries resulting from inter-community violence. Injuries of Ahmadis in anti-Ahmadiyya violence *declined* in 2005 from an estimate of around 50 in 2004 to an estimate of around 18. (Appendix B Table E.3). Reported injuries in CHT also *declined* in 2005 compared to 2004 by 64%, to 71 (Appendix B Table E.10).

Reported injuries of Hindus in anti-Hindu violence in 2004 numbered 351 with no figures available for 2004 (Appendix B Table E.4). A comparison with injuries and deaths during the

run-up to the 2001 election reported by the same agency suggests a substantial *decline* in the levels of violence. In that election year 666 Hindus were reported as injured (Appendix B Table E.7). However, the next election is in 2007, so we need to assess levels of violence in late 2006 and early 2007 to see if the electoral cycle in violence repeats itself.

iii) Arrests. Evidence available from the CHT suggests a *decline* in arrests in 2005 by 67% to 35 (Appendix B Table E.10).

iv) Abductions. Evidence from the CHT suggests a *decline* in abductions in 2005 by 36% to 81 (Appendix B Table E.10).

v) Attacks on places of worship. The number of attacks on Ahmadiyya mosques *declined* from 9 to 5 (Appendix B Table E.3), but there were more bomb attacks, up from 0 to 2 (Appendix B Table E.3).

vi) Discrimination in employment. The available evidence on levels does not indicate serious discrimination. Representation of Hindus and Buddhists in government jobs was almost exactly equal to their share of the population, while Christian representation was almost three times their population share (Appendix B Table E.2). The latter probably reflects better than average educational attainments in the Christian community. But we have no figures on representation at different levels of employment or in the private sector.

vii) Discrimination in political representation. Hindu representation in parliament in 2005 was less than 1%, compared to their 10.5% share in the population but the indigenous population was proportionately represented with around a 1% share of the population (Appendix B Table E.1). These figures reflect to some extent the political marginalization of Hindus but also reflect the fact that Bangladesh has a first-past-the-post electoral system. The indigenous population is concentrated in some geographical areas while Hindus are more widely dispersed. As a result, Hindus can only be elected on mainly Muslim votes, but indigenous representatives can win on a largely indigenous vote. Nevertheless, the figures for Hindu representation are very low.

Areas where data and evidence are missing.
i) Gender violence against minorities. Very low absolute numbers (single digit) are reported for violence against Hindu women in 2005 in the only available source (Appendix B Table E.5) and for women in CHT (Appendix B Table E.10). This type of reporting on the basis of patchy newspaper coverage gives a false sense of statistical objectivity.

ii) Risk of asset loss faced by minorities. Available statistics for attacks on Hindu property in 2004 suggest relatively low levels of risk given the general insecurity faced by the population as a whole (Appendix B Table E.6). Without comparable figures for all communities, the degree of insecurity cannot be assessed.

iii) Extensive data on some minorities like Ahmadiyyas and Biharis, and social minorities like hijras is almost entirely missing.

iv) Extrapolation to national proportions is particularly important for data in this category because we want to compare insecurity for these subgroups with the average Bangladeshi levels of insecurity. The specific insecurity in this category has to be established as a

difference in the levels of insecurity compared to the average, where the average insecurity is not by any means low.

E-2) DRIVERS

The drivers of ethnic and religious violence are likely to be very different from the drivers of violence against other groups like the *hijras*. We will focus on the former at this stage given the almost total absence of data and evidence on other types of minority groups. Figure 12 shows a number of the most important drivers.


Figure 12 Drivers of Insecurity for Ethnic and Religious Groups

i) General drivers of human insecurity. Ethnic and religious groups suffer from the general insecurities faced by the entire population. The drivers of insecurity due to the operation of politics, the administration, the judiciary, conflicts over land and gender discrimination that have been already discussed operate for minorities too.

ii) Specific legal and political disadvantages. In addition, minorities suffer from specific legal and political disadvantages that make them more vulnerable to attack by factions engaged in political accumulation. These legal and political disadvantages vary across communities. For the Hindu minority, the history of political disadvantage goes back to animosities created during the partition of Bengal and continuing political tensions with India, which in turn have sustained a number of legal disadvantages that have made some Hindu properties vulnerable. These laws include the Vested Property Act and the Vested Property Return Bill of 2001 (see Category Report E). In addition, the departure of many middle class and wealthy Hindus to India from 1947 onwards has meant that Hindus still remaining in Bangladesh are predominantly poor and socially disadvantaged. These factors make many Hindus soft targets for political accumulators as they are less likely to mobilize their own contacts in political factions to protect themselves.

The indigenous population in the CHT face more overt political disadvantages as successive Bangladeshi governments have taken policy decisions to open up access to indigenous lands for plains people to relieve pressure on land elsewhere. This political context has allowed many individual political entrepreneurs to illegally capture indigenous lands, extract revenues, engage in illegal logging and smuggling, and in some cases, sexually exploit indigenous women. Addressing these special disadvantages would obviously improve the situation for religious and ethnic minorities.

iii) Ideological agendas attacking specific minorities. The third driver is more worrying because it refers to ideological agendas that are not part of the standard accumulation strategies of political entrepreneurs. These agendas are potentially much more sinister as the intention is to achieve *other goals* using minorities as scapegoats. Developing countries often suffer from internal disunity, and unfortunately a common but ultimately futile strategy is to try to unite the majority community by finding and attacking a scapegoat minority.

For instance, it is difficult to understand the attacks against Ahmadis except as a strategy of some extreme Islamic groups to create a greater Islamic unity by identifying 'deviants' and hoping to rouse large numbers of passive Muslims to appreciate the importance of ideological unity and discipline. These attacks were not primarily driven by the intention to capture Ahmadi land or extract resources from them. Some attacks on Hindus coming from ideological Muslim factions are also of this type, as indeed are attacks on Muslims in India coming from extremists in the BJP and other Hindu religious organizations.

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS
Exacerbating factors include the ones relevant for other types of insecurities as minorities are subject to the same drivers. In particular, there is a possible electoral cycle in violence against Hindus, largely because they are seen as a vote bank for the Awami League. Both major parties have been reported to use threats of violence either to prevent or to encourage Hindus to vote in particular ways. However, the seriousness of cyclical declines can vary from cycle to cycle, with a particularly serious decline during the 2001 elections. We are unable to assess the degree of *extra* risk faced by minority communities during election cycles, as there is a general decline in security across the board during elections and local factions frequently use threats against vulnerable constituencies to persuade them to vote in particular ways and attack each other's vote banks. Both the second and third drivers can deteriorate as a result of deteriorations in external conditions. In particular, violence against Muslims in India can provoke violence against Bangladeshi Hindus by Muslim extremist groups, as we saw during the time of the Ayodhya crisis in India.

E-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

This limited information is summarized in Figure 13. *We have no credible information on long-term trends. There is some evidence of a cyclical improvement in 2005 compared to 2004 but based on data and evidence in which we have low confidence. Our analysis of drivers also suggests that the general political crisis emerging in 2006 could have an effect on security in this category unless a resolution can be rapidly found.* This possibility is shown by the projection of the cycle along the broken blue lines.

Figure 13 Violence and Discrimination against religious and ethnic groups

E-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

i) Many long-term drivers are similar to those facing the general population. Any vulnerable group is particularly attractive for political predation, and minorities are vulnerable for the types of reasons discussed. However, many groups within the majority community are also vulnerable to the same drivers.

ii) Legal and political disadvantages. In addition, many minorities suffer specific legal and political disadvantages that need to be addressed. The Vested Property Act and the Vested Property Return Bill of 2001 are examples.

iii) Countering scapegoat strategies. The third driver is potentially the most worrying for the security of minorities. Attempts to create new more united political coalitions by attacking minorities have always failed in Bangladesh. But more could be done by civil society groups across the Indian subcontinent to create greater public awareness that these strategies have always failed to achieve greater internal unity (at the expense of the minority) wherever they have been tried in the Indian subcontinent. The example of the BJP in India is a salutary one and not enough comparisons and discussions take place across our borders to analyse common problems and challenges.

F. HUMAN INSECURITY DRIVEN BY CRIME

Political accumulation strategies of patron-client factions can often blur into the activities of criminal gangs that operate with political protection. This has made the escalation of different types of crime in Bangladesh difficult to contain or manage.

F-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

We have already looked at most of the available evidence on crime in our other category assessments. For 2005 we have already reported available newspaper-based sources on the following: deaths and injuries during political conflicts (up), political kidnappings and abductions (up), attacks on journalists (contradictory reports on directions of change), rapes (down in most reports), domestic violence (contradictory reports), acid attacks (down), murders of women (contradictory reports), and trafficking of women (contradictory reports).

There were no additional data we could collect for changes in levels of crime in 2005. However, we have some more data on levels, with the usual caveats about the data.

i) Narcotics. The RAB website reports 3468 cases of narcotics related crime in 2005. This is a growing area of concern in Bangladesh, but we need much better incidence data, and also data on types of narcotics being used (Appendix B Table F.17).

ii) Involvement of law-enforcing agencies in crime. Police (and RAB) officers are themselves frequently involved in crime and transgressions of rules. According to one report that gives a breakdown by categories of officers, more than half of the entire service received various levels of punishment over the 4-year period from 2002-2006 (Appendix B Table F.16).

iii) Qualitative evidence of a growing brutalization of society. The gradual brutalization of society is particularly worrying as violence is not always perpetrated by criminals, but sometimes also by their victims. It is common for suspected criminals ranging from pickpockets to truck drivers involved in fatal accidents to be beaten to death or close to death by angry passers-by. Suspected thieves apprehended in rural areas may be summarily punished by having their eyes gouged out. These frequent examples of summary revenge, and indeed the frequent crime of acid throwing by young men who believe they are in love with the victim, are worrying indicators of deep social malaise.

Missing Data.
i) Impact on different income classes. For a proper assessment of human insecurity we would have liked to assess the impact of different types of crime on individuals in different income classes.

ii) Extortion and Protection Rackets. Protection rackets are extremely lucrative in large bazaars and hats, where *mastans* operate with political protection. We have no data on the incidence of protection money extracted from different income classes or businesses of different sizes. This information would help to assess the insecurity of different groups.

F-2) DRIVERS

The 'normal' drivers of crime are serious enough and even advanced countries have levels of crime that are often hard to contain. However, Figure 14 shows that in developing countries like Bangladesh, there are two other drivers that make crime a major source of human insecurity.

Figure 14 Drivers of Crime

i) Normal drivers of crime. These include drivers like poverty, opportunism, and drug addiction.

ii) Political protection of crime as a source of off-budget funds. We have seen in our discussion of political insecurity, political factions require off-budget funds to meet the demands of their clients and to maintain their organizational power in contests with other factions (who are offering their clients similar payoffs). Crime bosses, who manage local protection rackets, organize smuggling, corner markets or engage in extortion can then become attractive assets for competing factions. In some cases political factions can provide protection and cover to criminal activities, in other cases, crime bosses or *mastans* can themselves become political players and gain respectability as politicians who can 'deliver'. Once this happens, the fight against crime becomes a sporadic event targeting 'freelance' criminals, while 'protected' criminals are ignored or let off. Occasionally, a few protected criminals may be targeted by law enforcement agencies, particularly after changes of power at the centre when a new group takes over, or when transgressions have been particularly egregious and the public or vigilante groups threaten to take matters into their own hands, or as a result of factional disagreements within ruling groups and/or law enforcement agencies.

iii) Administrative and judicial weaknesses. The administration and the judiciary can themselves be sources of insecurity because of similar accumulation strategies of individuals and factions within these agencies. Often linked to political factions and operating in informal collusion, the administration and political processes are closely implicated in many aspects of crime, as the figures on numbers of police personnel punished demonstrates.

CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS
i) Possible incorporation of crime into global networks. Exacerbating the internal drivers is the possibility of integration into global networks involved in drugs, guns, human trafficking and arms. We have no knowledge of the seriousness of these links in Bangladesh, but it is possible that links already exist or may develop in the future and this will strengthen internal crime networks.

ii) Growing brutalization of society. The worrying brutalization of society and the increased willingness of ordinary citizens to mete out horrific punishments keeps crime in check. But the brutalization of society obviously has very damaging long-term effects. The incidence of acid crimes in Bangladesh has to be understood in this context of brutalization.

iii) Checks imposed by the self-interest of ruling groups. Finally, ruling groups in Bangladesh occasionally act to moderate aspects of political appropriation in their own self-interest. This is particularly true because much of the political appropriation is often led by lower level factions from which the ruling coalition may not necessarily benefit. The occasional emergence of agencies like RAB can have an immediate effect on reducing some of the excesses of criminal activities, but as we discussed earlier, these effects are not likely to be permanent given the drivers of insecurity associated with government agencies.

F-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS

Figure 15 summarizes the mixed evidence, based on the available data, but primarily based on an analysis of change in some of the drivers. The entry of RAB as a new agency is likely to have played a constraining role in the development of underlying trends in human security associated with crime. We do not know the underlying trends (question mark in the figure), but if the trend was moderately negative, RAB could be expected to have moderated this at least for some types of crime for a while. *There is some weak evidence from changes in drivers (particularly RAB activities) and public perceptions that aspects of security affected by crime improved in 2005. But our analysis also suggests that these improvements (if they are genuine and not largely perception-based) are at risk of being short term.*

It is important to remember that limited improvements in this category were achieved at the cost of a worsening in human security in terms of deaths in custody and in crossfire, referred to in our discussion of the administrative and judicial systems (Figure 9). In addition, our analysis also tells us we have to be cautious about the permanence of what has been achieved. As part of the administrative and judicial system, RAB is subject to the drivers pushing agencies into factional accumulation strategies (Figure 8). There is a high likelihood of a reversion of the trend unless more substantial drivers of political and bureaucratic accumulation are addressed. If agencies like RAB are to survive with a moderate degree of effectiveness, attention also has to be given to ring-fence these agencies with appropriate pay structures, recruitment and training strategies and (most difficult of all) a consensus amongst the dominant parties to refrain from using these agencies as tools in factional competition.


Figure 15 Crime and Human Security

F-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS

i) Importance of addressing deeper drivers. Fighting crime effectively in a clientelist polity requires attention to areas that may not appear to be closely related, such as achieving improvements in the fiscal space to enable more political demands to be accommodated within the budget, creating legitimate employment and accumulation opportunities for youth, particularly from the intermediate classes, and strengthening key administrative agencies.

ii) Punitive anti-crime strategies have questionable long-term sustainability. Strategies focusing directly on arresting or eliminating criminals (RAB is a prime example) can appear to yield quick improvements in security but they are not likely to be permanent. This does not mean that attempts to improve the efficiency of the police or of RAB are not important. But it does mean that we should be realistic about how feasible sustained improvement in these agencies can be without changing some of the other drivers.

iii) Improving the accountability of law enforcement agencies is a slow process. Reform efforts that focus on improving the accountability of law enforcing agencies and using public pressure to challenge the apparent impunity of well-known crime bosses or political *mastans* are not likely to yield quick results. These reform efforts should be sustained but our analysis can explain why progress is going to take time and is subject to changes in the political drivers.

Concluding Comments.

An important message coming out of this assessment is that very powerful crosscutting drivers affect most of our human security categories. In particular, political accumulation strategies play a critical role, in turn driven by the limited attractiveness of the employment and legitimate accumulation opportunities open to large swathes of politically powerful intermediate classes. Another common driver across many of our categories is the weakness of bureaucratic and judicial capacities, and pressures and incentives on these services to align with political accumulation strategies. The interlocking of political and administrative drivers for many critical human insecurities can help to explain why attempts at piecemeal reforms of governance that have sought to improve the accountability of governments and public officials appear not to have delivered significant results.

Secondly, our analysis of drivers suggests that even a clientelist political system has internal constraining factors that can keep moderate to high levels of insecurity at a stable and therefore manageable level. These factors are particularly important because they explain the difference between a political system that suffers from insecurity but can continue to perform and one that suffers greater and greater insecurity and ultimately collapses into virtual anarchy or into a fragmented polity controlled by competing warlords. Keeping an eye on these often informal mechanisms of balance can give advance warning of serious emerging problems.

Thirdly, within the dynamics of the system, there are nevertheless small, pragmatic reforms that can be pursued to weaken some of the drivers of human security, and we have discussed some of the most obvious ones in connection with each of our categories.

Finally, our examination of the data has identified serious shortcomings in the methods being used to monitor human security in Bangladesh. A credible monitoring system requires a sample survey approach to monitor small numbers of sub-categories of insecurity that can (over time) be combined with an analysis of drivers to provide early warning of potential changes in historic trends and cycles.

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Appendix A: Consultation Process

A preliminary consultation process was carried out in order to help the Bangladesh Human Security Assessment Team to identify the key categories and issues of human insecurity in Bangladesh. The consultation process aimed to include a range a actors, topics and political perspectives. One hundred individuals and organisations were contacted and invited to take part in the process. From these 40 responses were obtained, listed below, within the allocated time period. These include 15 Bangladeshi Non-Governmental Organisations, five International NGOs, five Bangladeshi Civil Society Organisations, five Bangladeshi Research Centres, five Bangladeshi and international academics and five international donors.

The choice of the categories of human insecurity, and the analysis contained within the reports, do not necessarily reflect the opinions of all of the consultation process participants. We are extremely grateful to all of the participants for their contributions.

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Appendix C: Methodology for Constructing Indicators/Scores to Assess Human Security over Time

Any assessment of human security in particular countries is open to a fair amount of subjectivity, but to be useful, scores for human security have to reduce this subjectivity to a minimum and make the areas of subjective judgement transparent. Many well-known scoring exercises are based on expert judgements where outsiders have little opportunity to examine whether expert judgements are correct, largely because the meaning of terms like 'high' 'low' or 'moderate' levels of risk are not clearly defined. This is a significant weakness of many scoring exercises, not only because it allows the results to be ignored by those who disagree with the scores, but also because comparisons of scores over time or across countries are subject to excessive subjective bias.

To reduce this problem as far as possible, our proposed methodology is to base the scores for every category and sub-category of human security on *judgements about the proportion of the potentially affected population that is subject to a particular type or severity of risk*. This assessment is likely to involve subjective judgement as census data is rarely available to assess most categories of risk, and so extrapolating from a sample to an assessment of proportions of population affected at the national level inevitably involves a judgement about the representativeness of the sample, and the researcher is free to amend the sample proportion when extrapolating to the national level. But at least these judgements will now be entirely transparent, and users of the scores will know what 'high', 'low' or 'moderate' means. This enables those who disagree with the judgement to provide alternative data or evidence and it also allows clear comparisons over time and space.

Thus, we may not be able to entirely do away with *subjective judgements,* but we should be able to reduce *subjective bias* as far as possible. The difference between bias (based on implicit prejudices) and judgement (based on explicit criteria and making clear what we know and what we do not know) is important to keep in mind if we are to construct unbiased scores. We have discussed in the main body of our report why the available data in Bangladesh based on newspaper figures for numbers affected in different categories of human security cannot be scaled up to national proportions of population affected even to orders of magnitude with any level of confidence. The only credible way of reaching any judgement on national proportions affected is to carry out statistically sound sample surveys. The degree of confidence we can have in the assessment will depend on the size (and expense) of the samples, but even relatively small samples of carefully stratified households will give us a statistically acceptable base for comparisons over time. A rough preliminary guess is that a sample size of around 1500-2000 households may be sufficient for an assessment exercise for tracking human security over time.

The starting point of the assessment exercise is to break down the assessment of human security into a number of categories selected through a consultative process. The Bangladesh consultation exercise identified 6 categories of human security that were each important for assessing an important aspect of the overall conditions of broader human security in Bangladesh (in areas not already assessed in economic assessments). We decided to conduct the scoring of each of these categories of human security on a scale between 1 (the highest level of security) and 4 (the lowest level of security). The scoring component of the human security assessment is to provide these 6 scores over time. While it is possible to summarize these 6 scores into an average score for human security, we believe that movements in these

different categories are likely to be so diverse that an average score is not likely to be a very meaningful figure.

Just as broader human security has many aspects, of which the most important are covered in our choice of 6 broad categories, within each category there are a number of different aspects of security, and a selection has to be made of a small number of sub-categories that capture a snapshot (not necessarily an exhaustive one) of changes in the category over time. To keep the assessment manageable, we propose selecting a small number of sub-categories (between 3 and 5) within each category, selected on grounds of representative or critical characteristics.

To keep the assessment of human security across categories simple and transparent enough for year-to-year comparisons of levels, we will take the average of scores of sub-categories within a category to construct a category score. An average category score has problems because different types of offsetting changes in sub-category scores may be difficult to distinguish if we only present the average score. Nevertheless, the loss of information within the category has to be balanced against the limitations of working with a large number of sub-category scores that will also make year to year comparisons difficult.

Given the potentially large number of possible sub-categories that may be used to assess the category, subjective biases affecting the assessment of any category can only be reduced by limiting the assessment to a small number of sub-categories that are relatively easy to assess, and which provide a representative (not exhaustive) assessment of critical aspects of human security within that category. Each sub-category should also be narrowly defined so that 'high' or 'low' levels of security in that sub-category can be unequivocally defined.

This method allows us to make the assessment exercise manageably simple, and also helps to avoid arbitrariness in judgements that can emerge if the assessment is for a complex mix of sub-categories that are not well defined. This is because if the assessor is judging a mix of sub-categories without breaking this up into explicit sub-categories, and if security in some sub-categories is improving and in others declining, the assessor's (unconscious) prejudices may determine the score allocated to the overall category.

Our method proposes to make these complex assessments transparent by forcing ourselves to make judgements about very narrowly defined sub-categories in an explicit way. Although we are not trying to do a quantitative measure of risk, we can improve the credibility of our scores if we can force ourselves to think quantitatively even though the evidence may not allow us to be exact. For instance, a judgement by an observer that domestic violence against women is 'rare' or 'common' is not only subjective but it is also unclear what the researcher's interpretation of common or rare may be, allowing wide variations in judgement. Instead, we should have scores that say something like: 'a score of 1 means that on the basis of the available evidence, domestic violence against women is likely to affect less than 10% of women'.

The researcher is still making a subjective judgement about the evidence since the available evidence will be a sample and the researcher has to use a judgement to extrapolate it and adjust it to the national level to reach a conclusion, but at least we know *what* the judgement is. In the future, if better information becomes available for some of these categories, the assessment of scores can be altered on the basis of these transparent criteria.

Therefore, our method should be to assess each category by breaking it down into a SMALL number of sub-categories that can be clearly scored according to ONE set of judgements or observations. The aggregation of these sub-categories will then give us an unequivocal score for the category.

Example: For Category D (Violence and Discrimination Against Women), a number of possible sub-categories can be identified, and then a small number selected based on data availability or the appropriateness for survey data collection. Examples of sub-categories include the following:

   a) Scale of domestic violence. The scale can be defined in terms of proportions of potential population affected by this type of violence: Domestic violence against women likely to affect less than 10% of women': score 1

The 10% figure is only suggestive at this stage. We should base the lower benchmark figure on some figure for the scale of domestic violence in countries that have a good record on this particular risk. We should adjust the scale to ensure that 'low threat' corresponds to standards that may be achievable in a country like Bangladesh. If we agree on 10% as low risk, the other categories could then follow in the following way:

'Domestic violence against women likely to affect between 10-20% of women': score 2

'Domestic violence against women likely to affect between 20-30% of women': score 3

'Domestic violence against women likely to affect more than 40% of women': score 4

The levels that trigger the highest insecurity score should also be calibrated so that it is a figure that could be reached in a nightmare scenario, rather than set so high that it could never be feasibly reached, or so low that the country is perpetually stuck at the highest level of insecurity. The appropriate levels are therefore a matter of judgement and the researchers can debate this, but it should be an explicit debate and the figure arrived at for the 'high' and 'low' levels should be transparent.

An alternative or additional sub-category for this category could be the severity of domestic violence. Here the scores could be set in the following way: 'Domestic violence against women is likely to result in the death or hospitalization of less than 1% of all women': score 1

'Domestic violence against women is likely to result in the death or hospitalization of between 1-3% of all women': score 2

'Domestic violence against women is likely to result in the death or hospitalization of between 3-5% of all women': score 3

'Domestic violence against women is likely to result in the death or hospitalization of more than 5% of all women': score 4

Another example of a sub-category that could be assessed through sample surveys is the level of fear experienced by women in moving around freely (or after dark). Here, the scores could be set in the following way:

'Less than 10% of women feel safe to walk or travel alone to shops/friends (or after dark)': score 1

'10-20% of women feel safe to walk or travel alone to shops/friends': score 2, and so on.

Not all sub-categories of insecurity within this category may be amenable to survey assessments. For instance, data on the incidence of rapes may be very difficult to collect in surveys given the sensitivity of the subject. Here, either a consistent external source of data has to be used for year to year comparisons (such as police data), with the appropriate degree of confidence registered for this type of data (see further discussion below), or this sub-category has to be abandoned altogether. The construction of a credible score for any category does *not* require that we cover all relevant sub-categories, but it does require that the categories we cover can be transparently assessed.

An overall score for the category of violence and discrimination against women would then be the average of the scores for all the sub-categories included within this category. It would be accompanied by a brief narrative explaining what the average category score was composed of, and the movements of sub-categories over the year that had resulted in an improvement or worsening of the overall category score. Even if the sub-categories changed in an uncorrelated way in subsequent years, it would still be possible to have a transparent indicator for the overall category with a different and nuanced narrative supporting the average score in each year.

Clearly, researchers will be making subjective judgements about the proportion of population affected by the insecurity and therefore scores are not objective judgements. To reach a conclusion about the population proportion, the researcher may combine information based on the survey with other sources of information and expert assessment to provide a judgement about the likely national figure for proportions of population affected. In other words, the survey is not intended to provide figures for a mechanical derivation of category scores. While any assessment methodology must retain an element of researcher judgement, there is clearly a difference between a subjective judgement and a judgement whose meaning is unclear and therefore open to subjective bias. We may not be able to avoid the former but we can and should aim to avoid the latter.

To further enhance the usefulness of these scores for policy-makers, the scores should come with an assessment of the confidence with which the researcher can present the score. Some scores may be based on a lot of evidence, extensive statistical data, very comprehensive surveys and expert researcher experience in this field. Others scores may be little more than a shot in the dark based on patchy surveys. In between, there may be estimates of population proportions based on relatively small sample surveys combined with a broad range of other information and expert judgement. Therefore, each score should have attached to it a confidence level that we can attribute to the score depending on how it was arrived at.

The suggested confidence levels need not be precise statistical confidence levels. For instance, the confidence levels could range in the following way, from ~ to *, **, to ***.

~ Data unavailable or very low confidence in score (hard evidence unavailable and tentative score based on patchy reports in press, partisan publications, researcher judgements based on hearsay and so on. In some cases this may result in no score being offered or in a tentative score with a confidence level of '~', equivalent to a 0). This does not mean that we disregard

these scores, but they should be given lower weight than scores at higher levels of confidence when constructing the big picture. Much of the available data on human security in Bangladesh is constructed from counting of newspaper stories and any scores based on this data should have a confidence level of ~ for the reasons discussed in the main report (Box 2).

* Credible data available for samples but extrapolation to country level is based on researcher judgement that is tentative. This level of confidence would be attributed if the evidence available was based on sound sampling but the researcher had to make guesses on how to extrapolate to the national level because the sample was very small or the stratification of the sample did not correspond very well with national population characteristics. Extrapolation to the country score is then based on not very confident judgements of the researcher about how typical or untypical these samples are.

** A higher level of confidence in the score follows if the sample data is large enough, stratified enough and expert knowledge is sufficient to allow a confident extrapolation from the sample to a national proportion of population affected. The higher level of confidence in this case reflects the fact that extrapolation to estimate population proportions affected by the particular risk is more credible.

*** The highest level of confidence could be reserved for data based on very large samples or on census data. For instance, we could reserve this confidence level for large samples covering more than 50% of the population affected by that risk or for data based on comprehensive censuses.

These confidence scores will be very important in writing up the overall risk assessment for each category and for the country as a whole in each year. With this methodology, each category and sub-category will have a score between 1 and 4, and a confidence level for that score between ~ and ***.

In dealing with each of our categories we need to keep in mind human security is likely to vary across classes and regions, and different social strata are likely to face very different risks. For instance, women belonging to rich or upper middle classes may face very different risks from lower middle class women, and both may be different from women from working class or very poor backgrounds.

When we design surveys of sub-categories, we need to keep this in mind and try to capture risks faced by different classes separately. This will help policy-makers in DFID and elsewhere in designing appropriate policies addressing human security.

In the following sections, we discuss each of our categories and suggest some sub-categories, from which the final sub-categories may be selected depending on the type of survey that can be conducted to gather annual or periodical data on human security.

A) Politics and the political system.

Potential sub-categories for which survey or other data could be collected:

a) Deaths, injuries and arrests related to political conflicts

b) Insecurity due to hartals, civil disorder etc (this has a particularly serious effect on the poor).

       i) Deaths in hartal-related violence
       ii) Injuries in hartal-related violence
       iii) Days lost due to hartals

c) Bombs and explosives that result in individuals getting maimed or killed (to exclude the very large number of smaller bombs that are often little more than large crackers that are common in Bangladesh).
Serious bomb blasts are more likely to be comprehensively recorded in police or newspaper reports and here surveys would not necessarily produce better data than the newspaper sources that are already available.

d) The number of days of "normal" operation of parliament (that is without walkouts and boycotts by the opposition). This is possibly another indicator of the intensity of political contestation between government and opposition that can contribute to human insecurity lower down the line. Here too, census data is appropriate, already available from various tracking agencies.

e) Economic effects of political insecurity on different income classes. Surveys could elicit information on illegal toll collection affecting different income classes, economic losses suffered during hartals by different classes and regions, and so on.

f) Risks of violence and insecurity faced by non-political actors. Surveys could reveal the proportion of population affected by injuries, threats of violence, lost schooling days and so on for different income classes and regions as a by-product of political faction-fighting, toll collections, hartals and other activities.

B) Conflicts over Land and Assets.

Possible sub-categories:

a) Proportion of landholders in different income and asset classes involved in conflicts, litigation and disputes over land and assets.

b) Proportion of owners subject to or involved in violence related to property disputes.

c) Time for completion of land cases in court and/or the proportion of cases that lead to a resolution of the dispute.

d) Impact of land and asset conflicts on incomes and assets of different income classes.

None of these indicators are available from newspaper based assessments, and here surveys are vital to track a critical are of human insecurity.

C) The administrative and judicial system:

Possible sub-categories:

a) Proportion of population involved in litigation and the average length of time and average cost of court cases of different categories (civil, land, criminal etc).

b) Deaths in police custody, including perhaps as a separate sub-category, deaths in cross-fire (eg police and RAB). Survey data could assess the numbers of families affected by such deaths, but small samples may not provide better information than the flawed data available in newspaper reports or in official records. Here, a better strategy may be to put pressure on official agencies to collect comprehensive data and publish these regularly.

c) Deaths in jail.

d) Figures for torture by RAB, police, and other security agencies. Sample surveys may provide much better information on these areas of insecurity compared to official data.

e) Impact of extractive demands by police and other public officials on the incomes of different income classes.

D) Violence and Discrimination Against Women.

Possible sub-categories:

a) Scale of violence against women (broken down into different income classes):
Abductions,
Rapes (this is unlikely to be truthfully revealed in surveys)
Acid-throwing

b) Female suicides

c) Key political participation indices (% of women in national parliament and local government). These are obviously relatively easily available census figures, but care should be taken because of the high probability of non-significant year-to-year changes due to random events.

d) Intensity of insecurity: Violent deaths (again differentiated across income classes). Gender is not the only determinant of violent death, but survey figures for the incidence of violent deaths could be compared across gender to track any significant changes over time.

e) Dowry-related deaths and injuries in different income classes.

f) Percentage of successful prosecutions reported by major women's organizations (classified by organization) and average time taken per prosecution.

E) Violence and Discrimination against Ethnic, Religious and Other Community Groups.

Possible sub-categories:

a) Scale of insecurity faced by specific minorities.

Violence faced by specific minorities (CHT, Hindus and other groups). Surveys could reveal proportions of minority population affected, that could be compared with proportions of the average population affected by violence.

Percentage participation of specific minorities in national parliament and local government (census data).

b) Intensity of violence, measured by deaths. (CHT, Hindus and other groups). Again, differences in proportions compared to the average population would reveal significant additional risks.

c) Success rate of prosecutions of specific crimes against named groups carried out by specific organizations.

d) Asset losses due to asset grabbing by other communities, again these may provide figures for proportions of assets that can be compared to the average incidence of insecurity faced by the general population identified in Category B.

F) Crime.

Possible sub-categories:

a) Deaths and serious injuries attributed to the consequences of criminal activity

Deaths of family members of surveyed families classified into different income classes,

Injuries in different income classes.

These figures could be double-counting with deaths and injuries due to political competition, but this is not necessarily a problem as these two sources of insecurity can closely overlap.

b) Kidnapping

c) Abduction of women

d) Trafficking of women

e) Scale of drug addiction

f) Conviction rates in criminal courts (overlaps with administrative category, but here it is also a driver of the extent of organized crime)

g) seizures of arms

h) income losses of different classes due to extortion and crimes carried out by criminal gangs.

All of these possible sub-categories are provided for illustration only. They are not an exhaustive list from which a final selection needs to be made. They are provided as an illustration because in each of these sub-categories a numerical scoring approach can be used to give a score with an unequivocal meaning. The precise sub-categories chosen for a future survey would have to be selected to be consistent with the overall survey design and survey size.